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Abstract
This thesis contributes to furthering the understanding of the macroeconomic impact of
two types of labor market institutions: temporary help service agencies and temporary
contracts.
In the ﬁrst chapter, I depart from the observation that employment in the temporary
help service industry in the United States has seen a secular rise in recent decades. The
chapter provides a theory of the temporary help service industry within the steady state
version of a random search model of the labor market with endogenous job destruc-
tion and a second sector in which employment relationships are intermediated. In this
framework temporary jobs are endogenously of short duration and recruitment is fast.
Conditions are provided under which intermediated employment relationships exist in
equilibrium. The implications of the model for two possible explanations of the secular
rise of employment in the temporary help service industry, technological progress and a
rise in ﬁrm-level uncertainty, are such that technological progress as an explanation is
favored.
In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of uncertainty shocks on a dual labor
market using the Spanish economy as a case study. In an empirical analysis, I ﬁnd that,
given my identiﬁcation strategy, ﬂuctuations in uncertainty cause a signiﬁcant drop
in temporary employment, a non-signiﬁcant reaction in permanent employment and a
signiﬁcant decline in GDP. Since in the data the responses to a second-moment shock are
similar to the responses to a ﬁrst-moment shock, a quantitative labor demand model of
the Spanish labor market is built and calibrated. I use this model to generate simulated
response functions to a (pure) second-moment, a (pure) ﬁrst-moment and a combined
ﬁrst- and second moment shock. I ﬁnd that the empirical impulse responses can only
partially be rationalized by the model when considering a (pure) second-moment shock.
A (pure) ﬁrst moment shock in the model generates impulse response functions similar
to the empirical ones. A combined ﬁrst- and second moment shock can not improve on
the ﬁrst-moment shock in replicating the data.
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1. Preface
This thesis is about the macroeconomic impact of two particular kinds of labor market
institutions: temporary help service agencies and temporary contracts. Temporary help
service agencies are labor market intermediaries that provide client ﬁrms with workers
on an as-needed basis. The resulting employment relationship is very peculiar since the
client ﬁrm is typically only responsible for the supervision of the worker on its premises
whereas all other responsibilities for the worker remain with the temporary help ser-
vice agency. Chapter one of this thesis contributes to understanding the secular growth
these type of employment relationships have displayed in the United States since the
early 1990s.
The rules on the usage of temporary contracts were relaxed by many European govern-
ments in response to the sluggish performance of many European labor markets in the
early 1980s. These types of employment contracts diﬀer from regular, or permanent,
employment contracts in that they typically oﬀer very little employment protection.
Chapter two of this thesis contributes to a large literature that tries to understand the
consequences of temporary contracts for labor markets by studying how labor markets
in which this type of contract is present react to uncertainty shocks.
In chapter one, I depart from the observation that employment in the temporary help
service industry in the United States has seen a secular rise in recent decades. In par-
ticular, the share of THS employment in total employment rose from a meager 0.3% in
1972 to about 1% in January 1990 to a value of about 2.0% since 2000.
The chapter provides a theory of the temporary help service industry within the steady
state version of a random search model of the labor market with endogenous job de-
struction and a second sector in which employment relationships are intermediated.
Intermediaries have to create call sheets which they seek to ﬁll with a worker. Once
they added a worker to their call-sheet, they seek to place this worker with a client ﬁrm.
The resulting employment relationship is triangular. As a consequence of this triangular
employment relationship, temporary jobs are comparatively expensive to maintain and
this means that they are destroyed relatively fast. The relatively short expected duration
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also means that from the perspective of regular ﬁrms temporary jobs have to be, relative
to regular jobs, quick to ﬁll. Consequently, the framework employed generates two of the
most salient features of jobs in the temporary help service industry endogenously: they
are of short duration and recruitment is fast. Subsequently, I provide conditions under
which intermediated employment relationships exist in the equilibrium of the model. I
ﬁnd that intermediaries need some special ability relative to the regular labor market in
order to be willing to provide their services and I identify matching ability as a possible
candidate.
The last part of this chapter investigate numerically the implications of the model for
two possible explanations of the secular rise of employment in the temporary help service
industry in recent decades: technological progress and a rise in ﬁrm-level uncertainty. I
ﬁnd that the implications of the theory favor technological progress as an explanation.
In chapter two, I investigate the impact of uncertainty shocks on a dual labor market,
that is a labor market that is segmented along the lines of permanent and temporary
contracts, using the Spanish economy as a case study. The Spanish economy is a par-
ticular relevant case study since temporary contracts are widely spread in Spain. They
account for about one third of all employment contracts in Spain since the early 1990s.
In the ﬁrst part of the chapter, I investigate the impact of uncertainty shocks on the
Spanish economy empirically through the lense of a structural VAR model. I make use
of an identiﬁcation strategy devised in Bloom (2009) which identiﬁes uncertainty shocks
as (exogenous) events that cause a sudden spike in proxies measures of uncertainty. I
show that one such proxy measure of uncertainty in the Spanish economy, volatility of
the main Spanish stock market index, the IBEX 35, displays large and sudden spikes
that can be associated with arguably exogenous events such as the ﬁrst and second Gulf
War or Bear Stearn's bailout. I ﬁnd that, given my identiﬁcation strategy, these ﬂuctu-
ations cause a signiﬁcant drop in temporary employment, a non-signiﬁcant reaction in
permanent employment and a signiﬁcant decline in GDP.
Since I also ﬁnd that in the data the responses to a second-moment shock are similar to
the responses to a ﬁrst-moment shock, a quantitative labor demand model of the Spanish
labor market is built, calibrated and simulated in the second part of the chapter. Key
features of the model are adjustment costs on both types of labor and a time-varying
second moment of the driving process. I use this model to generate simulated response
functions to a (pure) second-moment, a (pure) ﬁrst-moment and a combined ﬁrst- and
second moment shock. I ﬁnd that the empirical impulse responses can only partially be
rationalized by the model when considering a (pure) second-moment shock. A ﬁrst mo-
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ment shock in the model generates impulse response functions similar to the empirical
ones. A combined ﬁrst- and second moment shock can not improve on the ﬁrst-moment
shock in replicating the data.
3
2. Chapter 1: The Temporary Help
Service Industry and the Macro
Economy
2.1. Introduction
Temporary help service (henceforth abbreviated as THS) agencies are labor market
intermediaries who's business consists of placing workers with client ﬁrms for often short
periods of time. The resulting employment relationships are triangular: the client ﬁrm
pays a fee to the agency which uses part of this fee to compensate the worker.1As
ﬁgure 2.1 illustrates, the incidence of these peculiar employment relationships has seen a
secular rise in the United States in the last 20 years: Employment in the THS industry
more than doubled between January 1990 and October 2014. Maybe more importantly,
the share of THS employment in total employment rose from a meager 0.3% in 1972 to
about 1% in January 1990 to a value of about 2% since 2000.
This paper addresses the question of what accounted for the rise of employment in
the THS industry in a random search model of the labor market with endogenous job
destruction. In particular, a two-sector version of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
(henceforth abbreviated as DMP) framework with endogenous job destruction is put
forward where in one of the sectors employment relationships are created with the help
of intermediaries. It is shown that the model endogenously generates two of the main
features of employment relationships in the THS industry: recruitment costs are low
and job durations are short. Consequently, turnover in the intermediated sector of the
economy is high just as it is in reality. Subsequently, in a numerical analysis, I evaluate
1The fact that THS agencies are the employer of the worker, responsible for everything but on-site
supervision, distinguishes them from other intermediaries in the labor market such as headhunters,
job boards and public employment agencies. Moore (1965) provides an early description of the
workings of the THS industry.
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Figure 2.1.: Employment in the THS industry between January 1990 and October 2014
(monthly data, source U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the values for
September and October 2014 are marked as preliminary by the BLS).
the eﬀect of technological progress and a change in the economic environment that
comes in the form of increased dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity on the incidence
of intermediated employment relationships.
Preview of the Model The economic environment in this paper is based on the
random search framework with endogenous job destruction pioneered in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). The novelty in this paper lies in the consideration of two labor markets
which I will refer to as the temporary and the regular labor market. The regular labor
market functions just as the single labor market in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The
temporary labor market, however, is characterized by the presence of intermediaries who
are indispensable for the creation of matches between ﬁrms and workers in this market.
More speciﬁcally, intermediaries can create call sheets which they seek to ﬁll with an
unemployed worker. Intermediaries who were successful in adding a worker to their call
sheet then seek to place this worker with a client ﬁrm. Once an intermediary-worker
pair has established contact with a client ﬁrm, the intermediary bargains with the ﬁrm
over the total surplus of the match while at the same time she bargains with the worker
over the division of the share of the surplus she was able to appropriate from the ﬁrm.
Consequently, the ensuing employment relationship is triangular, and the intermediary
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continues to appropriate a share from the output generated by the worker and the
ﬁrm for the whole duration of the employment relationship. This assumption on the
bargaining structure is justiﬁed by the fact that in reality THS employment relationships
are triangular as well: In particular, THS agencies typically charge client ﬁrms an hourly
fee for the worker which then goes into the compensation of the worker, the coverage of
overhead expenses and possibly proﬁts.2 Further key features of the model are ex-ante
homogenous jobs, free entry from intermediaries into call sheet creation and free entry
into the creation of temporary and regular jobs for ﬁrms.
Preview of Results The ﬁrst set of results concerns the characteristics of intermediated
jobs in the steady state of the model. In particular, intermediated jobs are quicker to
ﬁll and of shorter duration than regular jobs. The intuition for this result is that, due
to the presence of the intermediary, temporary jobs are comparatively more expensive
to maintain. Therefore, they are more likely to be destroyed than regular jobs, or, put
diﬀerently, they are of shorter expected duration. Since they are of shorter expected
duration, they have to be quicker to ﬁll as otherwise (regular) ﬁrms would not want to
create jobs in the intermediated sector. This, in turn, then also implies that job creation
and job destruction in the intermediated sector are high.
The second set of results provides an answer to the question under what conditions
the model economy allows for an equilibrium in which intermediaries ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to provide their services. In particular, I reduce the set of equations that determine
the equilibrium variables to a single equation that reﬂects the intermediaries' cost and
beneﬁts of entry. I show that this equation is monotone. It can, therefore, be used
to easily check whether an equilibrium with labor market intermediaries exists for a
given parameterization of the economy. More importantly, this equation can be used to
demonstrate formally that an equilibrium with an intermediated labor market can only
exist if the intermediary is better than the regular labor market in creating matches
between workers and ﬁrms.
In summary, these results imply that this paper provides a formal theory of the THS
industry that endogenously generates two of the most salient aspects associated with the
industry: the short duration of temporary jobs and the low recruitment costs for ﬁrms.
Indeed, a look at the data conﬁrms that all jobs last for about 2.5 years on average3
2See for example Autor et al. (1999), p. 28 and Moore (1965), p. 554.
3See for example Shimer (2005).
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whereas the average temporary jobs lasts for about 2.5 months4. Further, the second set
of results shows that a precondition for this outcome is the industry's ability to provide
matches more eﬃciently than the regular labor market. This seems to be a very intuitive
precondition given that ﬁrms in this industry specialize in the creation of matches.
Subsequently, I turn to a numerical analysis of the model. In particular, I evaluate the
implications of the model for two possible explanations for the secular rise of employment
relationships intermediated by the THS industry: technological progress that beneﬁted
the matching technology at the hands of the intermediaries relative to the matching
technology prevailing in the regular labor market and a change in the economic envi-
ronment that comes in the form of increased dispersion in the idiosyncratic productivity
shock. I ﬁnd that both explanations can account for the observed rise in employment
relationships intermediated by the temporary help service industry and that the change
required in the underlying parameter is of plausible magnitude in both cases. However,
the diﬀering implications of the two driving forces on the unemployment rate and the
duration of regular jobs make technological progress, according to the model, a more
plausible explanation for the secular rise of THS employment in recent decades.
2.1.1. Related Literature
This paper is chieﬂy related to two partly overlapping literatures. From a methodological
point of view, it draws on the literature that developed the search and matching approach
to the study of the labor market. With regards to its subject matter, it is related to a
literature that dealt with various aspects of the THS industry.
The search and matching approach to the study of the labor market was developed in
Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). I consider an environment in
which the job destruction decision is endogenous. Therefore, my paper is particularly
closely linked to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Further, I consider a labor market
with an intermediated and a regular sector which relates my paper to the literature
that considers multiple sectors in the search and matching approach to the study of the
labor market. One focus of this literature has been sectoral reallocation. In this line
of research Davidson et al. (1987), Davidson et al. (1988) and Hosios (1990) are early
contributions whereas Baley (2012), Chang (2012) and Pilossoph (2014) are more recent
papers. Another focus has been the analysis of economies that features both an informal
4See for example American Staﬃng Association (2010).
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and a formal employment sector. Examples for this literature are the papers by Boeri
and Garibaldi (2007), Zenou (2008), Albrecht et al. (2009) and Ulyssea (2010). My
paper diﬀers form this literature by having a diﬀerent subject matter. The only paper
from this literature that also deals with the THS industry is the paper by Neugart and
Storrie (2005) which is discussed in more detail below.
The THS industry has been studied extensively from a microeconomic perspective. For
instance, there are many papers that study the eﬀect of employment in the THS on the
career outcomes of workers. An introduction to this literature with many references can
be found in Autor (2009). Another class of papers focuses on the motivation of ﬁrms to
hire workers through THS agencies. The papers by Estevao and Lach (1999), Houseman
(2001), Ono and Sullivan (2010) are examples for these kind of studies. There are also,
albeit relatively few, papers that study the inner workings of the THS industry. An
example is Autor (2001) who provides an explanation for the puzzling prevalence of ex
ante and free general skills training in the THS industry. Another example is Komiss
(2008) who analyzes how THS agencies deal with the danger that once they matched a
worker and a ﬁrm the latter two agents have a strong incentive to eliminate the agency
from the employment relationship.
For this paper particularly relevant are the studies that focus on the growth of the THS
industry and or analyze the industry from a macroeconomic perspective. One of these
studies is Autor (2003) who connects the rise of employment in the THS industry to the
curtailment of the employment-at-will doctrine5 that occurred contemporaneously. He
ﬁnds that 20% of the growth of THS employment between 1973 and 1995 between can
be attributed to the curtailment of the employment-at-will doctrine. Curtailments in
the employment-at-will doctrine can be understood as an increase in ﬁring costs.6 Since
my theory does not feature ﬁring costs and Autor (2003)'s ﬁndings certainly leave room
for other explanations for the observed growth in THS employment, I view my paper as
complementary to his.
House and Zhang (2012) is another paper that studies the THS industry from a macroe-
conomic perspective. They focus on information problems in the labor market in a
modelling framework that does not feature search frictions. In their model, THS agen-
cies can emerge since they are able to guarantee the quality of a worker. Besides having
5The employment at will doctrine states that workers and ﬁrms are free to terminate their employment
relationship at any time and for any reason if there is not an explicit contract between them that
says otherwise.
6See also the model in section II in Autor (2003).
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a very diﬀerent modelling framework and focus, their model is not able to speak en-
dogenously to the characteristics of intermediated jobs and they do not consider the
eﬀect of increased dispersion in the idiosyncratic productivity shock on the incidence of
intermediated employment relationships.
The paper most closely related to my work is Neugart and Storrie (2005). They focus
on the impact of technological progress on the incidence of intermediated employment
relationships in a random search model of the labor market that allows for transitions
from intermediated jobs to regular jobs but does not feature endogenous job destruction.
Their ﬁndings are similar to mine in the sense that they show that technological progress
can account for the growth in THS employment. However, their model is not able to
generate salient features of intermediated jobs endogenously and they are not able to
study the impact of increased dispersion in the idiosyncratic productivity shock on the
incidence of intermediated employment relationships.
Outline The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces
the economic environment. Section 2.3 characterizes the equilibrium of the economy and
derives results related to the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium that features
labor market intermediation. Section 2.4 analyzes the eﬀect of technological progress
and increased dispersion on the model's equilibrium numerically. Section 3.5 concludes.
Proofs and derivations are contained in the appendix.
2.2. The Model
The model is based on the classical random search model of the labor market with en-
dogenous job destruction as pioneered by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The main
diﬀerence to the standard model is the existence of a temporary (t) labor market be-
sides the regular (r) labor market. The regular labor market works in the same way as
the labor market in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In the temporary labor market
intermediaries are indispensable for the creation of matches. Matching through inter-
mediaries is a two stage process: First, intermediaries have to create empty call sheets
which they seek to ﬁll with a worker from the pool of the unemployed. Once the call
sheet is ﬁlled, the intermediary worker pair seeks to place the worker with a ﬁrm. Upon
ﬁnding a ﬁrm for her worker, the intermediary bargains with the ﬁrm over the total
surplus of the match. At the same time the worker intermediary pair bargains over how
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to split the part of the total surplus that the intermediary eventually appropriates. I
assume that intermediaries can costlessly create empty call sheets. Firms can freely cre-
ate vacancies in the temporary and in the regular labor market. Workers search in both
markets simultaneously. A graphical illustration of the model is provided in appendix
A.1.
2.2.1. Basics
Time is continuous, all agents are inﬁnitely-lived, risk-neutral and discount the future
at common rate r. Firms possess control over a constant returns to scale production
technology that produces an output of p+ σ per unit time when paired with a worker.
p is common across matches whereas σ is an idiosyncratic component of output. It is
assumed that  changes in accordance with a Poisson process whose parameter is λ. If
a match is hit by a shock, a new  is drawn from a cdf F whose support is given by
(−∞, u) with u <∞.
The following sections describe the two labor markets and the asset pricing equations of
the model.
2.2.2. Regular Labor Market
In the regular labor market vacancies vr and unemployed workers u are matched through
a standard7 matching function mr = M r (vr, u). The corresponding vacancy ﬁlling rate
is qr and the job ﬁnding rate is pr.8 The value of a match in the regular labor market
with idiosyncratic productivity  to the ﬁrm is F rJ () and to the worker it is W rJ ().
When a match is separated, the ﬁrm gets the value of a vacancy in the regular labor
market F rV and the worker becomes unemployed yielding him a value of WU . The
surplus of a match characterized by  in the regular labor market is then given by
Sr () = F rJ () +W rJ ()− F rV −WU .
I assume that the ﬁrm at any point in time can appropriate a share 0 < ηrF ≤ 1
of Sr () and the worker gets the remainder ηrW = 1 − ηrF . There is free-entry into
7All matching functions in this paper are, as in most of the literature, assumed to be homogeneous of
degree one and concave in both arguments.
8As usual: qr = qr (θr) ≡ mr(vr,u)vr with θr ≡ v
r
u - and p
r = pr (θr) ≡ mr(vr,u)u .
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vacancy creation in the regular labor market.
2.2.3. Temporary Labor Market
The temporary labor market is divided into two submarkets. The ﬁrst of these consists
of intermediaries equipped with an empty call sheet vc and unemployed workers u who
seek to from a call sheet relationship with each other.9 The rate at which unemployed
workers and intermediaries meet in this market is determined by a standard match-
ing function mc = M c (vc, u) with call sheet ﬁlling rate qc and call sheet ﬁnding rate
pc.10 An important assumption here is that this stage of the temporary labor market is
characterized by search frictions. One view of labor market intermediaries is that they
eliminate search frictions in the labor market. I take the view here that they are not
able to eliminate frictions completely and that locating intermediaries and forming a
match still takes time, resources and has a certain element of randomness to it.11
The value of having a worker on call to the intermediary is denoted by I tV . The value of
being on the call sheet to the worker is W tV . If the worker intermediary pair separates,
the worker becomes unemployed, yielding him a value ofW u, and the intermediary is left
with an empty call sheet with value IcV . The presence of search frictions in this market
imply that a match between an intermediary and a worker entails a surplus which is
given by
Sc = W tV + I tV −W u − IcV .
I assume that the intermediary at any point in time can appropriate a share 0 < ηcI ≤ 1
from Sc and the worker gets the remainder ηcW = 1 − ηcI . This approach provides a
tractable alternative to the arguably more realistic approach of contract posting from
the intermediary.
9Regarding the terminology: workers that are registered with a temporary help service agency but
currently not placed at a client ﬁrm are frequently referred to as being on call. I call the database
which the agency uses to manage these workers a call sheet. Intermediaries who have not yet
established contact with a worker have an empty call sheet. The relationship between a worker
and an intermediary at this stage is called a call sheet relationship.
10See footnote 8.
11For instance, THS agencies typically engage in screening and training activities (see Autor (2001) and
Autor et al. (1999) for an analysis for the training activities of THS ﬁrms) before they are willing
to place a worker with a client ﬁrm. This process is, of course, time consuming and its outcome
could easily have an element of randomness to it. It is not clear that a matching function meant to
capture this process is standard in the sense of footnote 7. However, since there is no information
on this matching function available, standard assumptions on the matching function seem like a
reasonable starting point.
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The second submarket of the temporary labor market consists of intermediary worker
pairs (created in the ﬁrst submarket) and (regular) ﬁrms who seek to form triangular
employment relationships12 with each other.The rate at which worker intermediary pairs
(mass uc) meet vacancies (mass vt) is determined by a standard matching function
mt = M t (vt, uc) with qt being the rate at which ﬁrms locate intermediary worker pairs
and pt being the rate at which intermediary worker pairs locate ﬁrms.13 Consequently, as
in the ﬁrst submarket, I assume that intermediaries are not able to eliminate all search
frictions in this segment of the labor market as well.14
Matches in the second submarket will be characterized by some match-speciﬁc produc-
tivity . I denote the value of such a match to the intermediary by I tJ (), to the worker
by W tJ () and to the ﬁrm by F tJ (). In case a match is not formed or separated,
the values of the outside options of the three parties involved are given by I tV for the
intermediary, W tV for the worker and by F tV for the ﬁrm. The latter is simply the
value of a vacancy in the temporary labor market. The former two are the value of the
intermediary worker match to the worker and the intermediary. Consequently, I assume
that upon destruction of the triangular employment relationship the worker intermedi-
ary pair remains together which seems a natural assumption in the context of the THS
industry. The presence of search frictions implies again that any match in this market
entails a surplus which here is given by
St () = F tJ () +W tJ () + I tJ ()− F tV −W tV − I tV .
It is assumed that the ﬁrm can appropriate 0 < ηtF ≤ 1 of St (), the intermediary
can appropriate ηtI (ηtI + ηtW ≤ 1) and the worker gets the remainder ηtW = 1 −
ηtI − ηtF . This bargaining arrangement is equivalent to one in which the client ﬁrm and
the intermediary bargain over the total surplus with bargaining weights ηtF (ﬁrm) and
1 − ηtF (intermediary) and the intermediary and the worker bargain over the share of
12Employment relationships intermediated by a THS agency are frequently referred to as triangular
since the arrangement is typically such that the worker performs his duties at the site of the client
ﬁrm which pays the THS agency an hourly fee out of which the agency compensates the worker.
In this arrangement, the client ﬁrm is typically only responsible for the supervision of the worker
whereas the THS agency is responsible for wage payments, social security contributions and the like
(see Moore (1965)).
13See footnote 8.
14In this market, frictions might arise from the fact that intermediaries have to learn about the exact
needs of their client ﬁrms or from issues related to workers turning out to be unﬁt for the assignment
in question. The caveat from footnote 11 also applies.
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the total surplus which the intermediary was able to appropriate.15 Since in actuality
the client ﬁrm and the THS agency agree on a fee out of which the THS agency has to
compensate the worker (see footnote 12), I view this as a good description of reality.
2.2.4. Firms
Firms can be in one of four states: they can have a vacancy in the temporary or in the
regular labor market and they can engage in productive activity with a temporary or
with a regular worker. This section describes the asset pricing equations associated with
these four states.
The asset pricing equation for the value of a vacancy in the regular labor market is given
by
rF rV = −k + qr (F rJ (u)− F rV ) . (2.1)
The ﬁrst term is the maintenance cost k of the vacancy. The second term is the capital
gain the ﬁrm enjoys when paired with a worker. Meeting a worker happens at rate qr.
It is assumed that newly created jobs produce at productivity u.16
In the temporary labor market the value of a vacancy is given by
rF tV = −k + qt (F tJ (u)− F tV ) . (2.2)
The interpretation is analogous to the one given for equation 2.1. The assumption of
free-entry into both labor markets is going to drive F tV and F rV to zero.
The asset pricing equation for a ﬁlled job in the regular labor market with current
15In the equivalent arrangement the ﬁrm would get ˜ηtFSt and the intermediary would appropriate(
1− ˜ηtF
)
St of the surplus from the match. The bargaining between the worker and the in-
termediary in turn mean that the worker gets ˜ηcW
(
1− ˜ηtF
)
St and the intermediary eventually(
1− ˜ηcW
)(
1− ˜ηtF
)
St. The bargaining weights from the main text are then obtained by setting
ηtF = ˜ηtF , ηtW = ˜ηcW
(
1− ˜ηtF
)
and ηtI =
(
1− ˜ηcW
)(
1− ˜ηtF
)
St.
16The fact that newly created jobs produce at the highest possible productivity is a standard assumption
in the literature (see for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). It is usually justiﬁed by the
argument that newly set-up ﬁrms can, and will, choose the best available production technology
and or location at the time. The assumption is in any case not crucial for the theoretical results of
this paper since they would also hold if matches would start at some randomly drawn idiosyncratic
productivity level. I stick with the approach taken in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) to make the
exposition as clear as possible.
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match-speciﬁc productivity  is
rF rJ () = p+ σ− wr () + ληrF
ˆ u
−∞
[max {Sr (x) , 0} − Sr ()] dF (x) . (2.3)
The ﬁrst part of this equation reﬂects instantaneous proﬁts. They are given by the
diﬀerence of the match's product and the wage paid to the worker. The second part
reﬂects the capital gain that accrues to the ﬁrm when the match in question is hit by a
match-speciﬁc productivity shock. These shocks occur at rate λ. Importantly, if such a
shock hits, the match is only continued if the new surplus is positive.
The corresponding value in the temporary labor market is given by
rF tJ () = p+ σ− f () + ληtF
ˆ u
−∞
[
max
{
St (x) , 0
}− St ()] dF (x) . (2.4)
The ﬁrst part reﬂects again instantaneous proﬁts. In this case, they are given by the
product of the match less the payment the ﬁrm makes to the intermediary, which I
denote by f () (f for fee).17 The second part is the capital gain that accrues to the
ﬁrm in case the match in question is hit by a match-speciﬁc productivity shock. Only
matches with a positive surplus remain together.
2.2.5. Workers
Workers can be in four states: unemployment, working in a regular job, working in
a temporary job and they can ﬁnd themselves on the call sheet of an intermediary.
Unemployed workers search for jobs in both labor markets simultaneously. They may
receive either an oﬀer from a THS agency to be added to their call sheet or they may
receive an oﬀer for a regular job from a ﬁrm that recruits in the regular labor market.
The asset pricing equation for the value of unemployment is then
rW u = b+ pc
(
W tV −W u)+ pr (W rJ (u)−W u) .
Here, b represents the ﬂow beneﬁts of the worker when unemployed. He locates call
sheets at rate pc which yields him a capital gain of
(
W tV −W u). He ﬁnds regular
17See the interpretation of the bargaining process provided at the end of section 2.2.3.
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jobs with capital gain
(
W rJ (u)−W u
)
at rate pr.18 The assumption that workers may
receive oﬀers from both markets is made for two reasons: First, it proved to be much
more tractable then alternative assumptions.19 Second, many more workers then the
THS industry's point in time employment suggests are employed by it in any given year.
Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to assume that many unemployed workers consider
temporary and regular jobs simultaneously (see Autor (2001) and Berchem (2006)).
The asset pricing equation for the value of a match in the regular labor market to the
worker is given by
rW rJ () = wr () + ληrW
ˆ u
−∞
[max {Sr (x) , 0} − Sr ()] dF (x) . (2.5)
The interpretation is identical to the one of equation 2.3.
There are two asset pricing equations for the worker in the temporary labor market.
The ﬁrst is the asset pricing equation which gives the value of being on the call-sheet of
an intermediary to the worker
rW tV = z + pt
(
W tJ (u)−W tV
)
+ κ
(
W u −W tV ) .
In this equation, z reﬂects the bargaining outcome between the worker and the inter-
mediary when they form a call sheet relationship. z can be interpreted as beneﬁts or
costs that arise to the worker when he is on the call-sheet of a THS agency but not on
assignment. These costs and beneﬁts could, for instance, stem from training activities.20
The second term is the capital gain that accrues to the worker in case the worker inter-
mediary pair gets matched with a ﬁrm. This happens at rate pt, and means that the
worker starts working in a temporary job with highest possible match-speciﬁc produc-
tivity u.21 In case the worker intermediary pair is subject to a separation shock, which
18This equation does not include a term that captures the value of receiving an oﬀer from both markets.
This is because this term vanishes as time intervals move to zero in the continuous time formulation.
19One alternative assumption would be to have workers direct their search towards one of the sectors
as in, for instance, Hosios (1990) and then close the model with a condition that states that the
values of unemployment have to be identical in all sectors of the economy. Another alternative
assumption would be to have a common matching function for both sectors as, for instance, in the
paper by Acemoglu (2001). The route taken here is shared with the papers by Neugart and Storrie
(2005), Ulyssea (2010) and Baley (2012).
20Training provided by THS agencies is a very common phenomenon. See Autor et al. (1999) and
Autor (2001).
21This assumption was discussed in footnote 16.
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are assumed to occur at exogenous rate κ,22 the worker becomes unemployed and incurs
a capital loss of
(
W u −W tV ).
The asset pricing equation for the value of working in a temporary job to the worker is
rW tJ () = wt () + ληtW
ˆ u
−∞
[
max
{
St (x) , 0
}− St ()] dF (x) . (2.6)
The interpretation of this equation is again analogous to equation 2.3 and 2.5.
2.2.6. Intermediaries
Intermediaries can be in three states. They can have an empty call sheet in which case
they are looking for a worker to add to the call sheet, they can have a ﬁlled call sheet
and they can have a worker working on a temporary job.23 This section presents the
asset pricing equations corresponding to these three states.
The asset pricing equation for the value of an empty call sheet to the intermediary is
given by
rIcV = −kcI + qc [I tV − IcV ] .
The activity of seeking to ﬁll an empty call sheet entails costs of kcI to the intermediary.
These costs could for instance stem from expenses associated with screening and training
workers. In case the intermediary locates a worker, which happens at rate qc, she enjoys
a capital gain given by the diﬀerence between the value of a ﬁlled and an empty call
sheet.
The asset pricing equation for the value of a ﬁlled call sheet is
rI tV = −z + pt [I tI (u)− I tV ]+ κ [IcV − I tV ] .
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the bargaining outcome between the worker and the intermediary
when they form a call sheet relationship which was discussed in the previous sections.
The second term is the capital gain the intermediary enjoys when he manages to place the
22Workers and intermediary pairs have to eventually separate as otherwise there will not be any unem-
ployed workers (or regular jobs) in the model's steady state. An exogenous separation rate seems
to be a natural choice given my modelling approach strives for simplicity at this part of the model.
It is also a common assumption in the search and matching literature (see, for instance, Pissarides
(2000)).
23See footnote 9 for an explanation of the terminology.
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worker on a job. The last term reﬂects the capital loss accruing to the intermediary when
the call sheet relationship with the worker gets separated by an exogenous separation
shock κ (see footnote 22).
The value of a worker on assignment to the intermediary is given by
rI tJ () = f ()− wt () + ληtI
ˆ u
−∞
[
max
{
St (x) , 0
}− St ()] dF (x) .
This equation reﬂects the fact that a worker who is working on a temporary job is paid
by the intermediary a wage wt (). This wage payment is made out of the fee f () the
intermediary receives from the ﬁrm. Otherwise, this equation is to be interpreted as
equations 2.5, 2.3 and 2.6.
2.2.7. Labor Market Stocks in the Steady State
In this section, I derive the equations that determine employment levels in the steady
state. Workers can be in four states: They can be unemployed (corresponding mass is
u), on the call sheet of an intermediary (uc) and they can be employed in a temporary
(et) or in a regular job (er). Since the population of workers is normalized to one we
have to have
1 = er + uc + u+ et (2.7)
Flows in and out of these stocks are equalized in the steady state. The ﬂows in and out
of call-sheets uc have to satisfy
upc + λF
(
tR
)
et =
(
pt + κ
)
uc. (2.8)
The left-hand side are inﬂows which are coming from the pool of the unemployed and
from temporary employment relationships that get separated24. The right-hand side are
outﬂows which consist of workers that transfer into temporary jobs and workers who get
separated from their intermediary and return to the pool of the unemployed.
The ﬂows into and out of regular employment er have to satisfy
24The separation rate is going to turn out to be λF (tR). In this formulation, it is assumed that the
separation decision in the regular and in the temporary labor market has the reservation property.
It will be demonstrated in section 2.3.1 that this is indeed the case.
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pru = erλF (rR) . (2.9)
The left-hand side are inﬂows from the unemployed that ﬁnd a regular job and the right-
hand side are outﬂows which consist of those regular jobs that receive an idiosyncratic
productivity shock and are destroyed as a consequence.
The ﬂows into and out of temporary employment et are analogously given by
ucpt
(
θt
)
= etλF
(
tR
)
. (2.10)
The population constraint 2.7 together with equations 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 determine the
equilibrium values of u, er, et and uc given thresholds etR and e
r
R as well as labor market
tightnesses θt, θr and θc as shown in appendix A.2.
2.3. Equilibrium
In this section, it is at ﬁrst described how to solve the model. Then, some properties of
the equilibrium are derived. Subsequently, results regarding existence and uniqueness of
the equilibrium are provided.
2.3.1. Solving The Model
To solve the model, it is ﬁrst argued that, as in the standard random search model of
the labor market with endogenous job destruction, the job destruction decision in both
labor markets has the reservation property25. To see this, notice that equations 2.3 and
2.4 imply that F tJ () and F rJ () are linearly increasing in . From the Nash bargaining
assumption, this implies that W rJ (), W tJ () and I tJ () are also linearly increasing
in .26 Nash bargaining further implies that both parties agree on the job destruction
decision.27 Therefore, Lemma 1 can be stated.
25Reservation property here means that all jobs characterized by an  below a certain threshold R are
destroyed whereas jobs characterized by an  above R keep producing.
26Nash bargaining implies that ηtW
(
F tJ ()− F tV ) = ηtF (W tJ () + ItJ ()−W tV − ItV ) and
ηrW
(
F rJ ()− F rV ) = ηrF (W rJ ()−Wu) .
27This is because if one party wishes to leave the match, the other party also wish to leave (see the
equations in footnote 26).
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Lemma 1. The job destruction decision in both labor markets has the reservation prop-
erty. Further, all involved parties agree on the job destruction decision.
The thresholds below which matches are dissolved in the regular and in the temporary
labor market are denoted by rR and 
t
R.
The key endogenous variables in this setting are the ﬁve variables (θr, θt, θc) and (rR, 
t
R).
Knowledge of these variables allows to obtain all other equilibrium variables. Appendix
A.3.1 shows how to derive with the help of lemma 1 the following ﬁve equations which
determine the equilibrium values of these variables.
The ﬁrst two of these equations are the job creation conditions for ﬁrms in the regular
k
qr
= ηrF
[
σ (u − rR)
r + λ
]
(2.11)
and in the temporary labor market
k
qt
= ηtF
[
σ (u − tR)
r + λ
]
. (2.12)
These expressions state that in both labor markets the expected costs of ﬁnding a worker
(left-hand side of both equations) have to equal the expected discounted beneﬁts from
the match to the ﬁrm for which the right-hand side of both equations is an expression.
The job destruction condition for jobs in the regular labor market in this environment
is given by
0 = p+ σrR +
σλ
r + λ
[ˆ u
rR
[1− F (x)] dx
]
(2.13)
−
b+ θcηcWηcI [kcI]+ θr
[
ηrW
ηrF
k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rWu
 .
As in the standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model, this equations says that at
the job destruction threshold rR the beneﬁts of remaining in the match have to exactly
equal the opportunity costs associated with remaining in the match. The beneﬁts are
as in the standard (one labor market) environment: they consist of the current output
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plus an option value that reﬂects the fact that if the worker ﬁrm pair remains together
they might receive a new productivity shock that lies above the reservation threshold.
The costs are standard as well in the sense that they are an expression for the worker's
imputed interested income from being unemployed rW u (which are the opportunity costs
of the match). In the set-up here, this value has an additional component (relative to
the standard model with just one labor market) since unemployed workers might receive
job oﬀers from both labor markets. This has important implications for the existence of
equilibrium (discussed in section 2.3.2), and also represents the channel through which
spillover eﬀects from one labor market into the other will take place.
The job destruction condition for jobs in the temporary labor market can be expressed
as
0 = p+ σtR +
λσ
r + λ
[ˆ u
tR
[1− F (x)] dx
]
(2.14)
−
b+ θckcI ηcWηcI + θr ηrWηrF k︸ ︷︷ ︸
rWu
− rkcIqc 1ηcI .
This condition is identical to the job destruction condition in the regular labor market
except for the very last term which increases the (opportunity) costs of matches in the
temporary labor market over and above the ones in the regular labor market. This term
represents the opportunity costs the intermediary incurs when staying in the current
match. These costs rise with the maintenance costs of an empty call-sheet kcI and fall
with the rate at which empty call-sheets are ﬁlled.
When combining the two job destruction conditions, equations 2.13 and 2.14, one gets
the following equation
σrR +
σλ
r + λ
[ˆ u
rR
[1− F (x)] dx
]
= (2.15)
σtR +
[
λσ
r + λ
]
×
ˆ u
tR
[1− F (x)] dx− r k
Ce
ηcIqC
.
Since the beneﬁts of the job in both markets are increasing in the reservation threshold,
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this equation allows us to immediately state the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If both labor markets are open, then job destruction in the temporary
labor market is higher than in the regular labor market, that is rR < 
t
R.
From this result we can then derive the following corollary
Corollary 1. If ηtF ≤ ηrF then qr < qt.
The corollary immediately falls from proposition 1 together with the fact that the job
creation conditions (equations 2.11 and 2.12) imply a positive relationship between the
vacancy ﬁlling rate q and the job destruction rate R.
It has been shown that in any equilibrium in which intermediaries exist one must have
that temporary jobs are destroyed more often than regular jobs, and, further, if ones
assumes that the ﬁrm can not bargain better vis-a-vis the intermediary then vis-a-
vis the worker, then vacancies in the temporary market have to have a quicker ﬁlling
rate. Therefore, the model generates two of the key characteristics of jobs in the THS
industry endogenously: quick ﬁlling rates and short duration which is synonymous with
high turnover.
The last of the ﬁve equilibrium equations is derived from the assumption that there is
free-entry into the creation of empty call sheets. It is given by
(r + κ)
kcI
qc
= ηcI

[
1− ηtF
ηtF
]
θtk −

rWu︷ ︸︸ ︷
b+ θckcI
ηcW
ηcI
+ θr
ηrW
ηrF
k

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sc

. (2.16)
This equation states that the costs of ﬁlling a call sheet with a worker (left-hand side)
have to equal the beneﬁts the intermediary enjoys from having a worker on his call sheet.
These beneﬁts are given by the product of the surplus from the match between the
intermediary and the worker and the share of this surplus that goes to the intermediary.
The surplus is composed of the value of unemployment which the worker gives up when
being together with the intermediary and a term which represents the value of searching
for a client ﬁrm.
With the ﬁve equations above one can deﬁne equilibrium as follows
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Deﬁnition 1. In this environment, a steady state equilibrium (with both labor markets
open) is given by a tuple (θr, θt, θc, rr, 
t
r) that satisﬁes equations 2.11 and 2.12, 2.13, 2.14,
2.16. The corresponding steady state labor market stocks are then given by equations
A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4.
2.3.2. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In the previous section, equations were derived that can be used to solve the model for an
equilibrium in which both labor markets are operating. Further, some characterization
of this equilibrium was provided. However, the characterization was made conditional on
the fact that the equilibrium is indeed such that both labor markets are operating. This
section is going to provide conditions under which both labor markets are indeed operat-
ing. Discussing existence of equilibrium in this setting is interesting because it is not as
readily guaranteed as in the standard one-sector random search model with endogenous
job destruction. Intuitively, this is because of the spillover eﬀects the two labor market
exert on each other. To see this more formally, notice that in an environment with only
one labor market the job destruction condition (equation 2.13) will be positive for small
θr and eventually negative for large θr if production at the highest possible idiosyncratic
shock is worthwhile28. In an environment with two labor markets and workers searching
in both labor markets, one can immediately see from equation 2.13 that this condition is
not enough for guaranteeing the existence of a θr that solves equation 2.13 since θc > 0
might still lead to a negative surplus even though θr is arbitrarily small.
Proposition 2 states conditions under which an equilibrium with both markets exist.
Proposition 2. An equilibrium in this economy with both markets open exists if
FEint (θc) =
ηcI
[[
1− ηtF
ηtF
]
fθt (θ
c) k −
[
b+ θc
ηcW
ηcI
kcI + fθr (θ
c)
ηrW
ηrF
k
]]
− (r + κ) k
cI
qC
(2.17)
is s.t. FEint (0) > 0 and FEint
(
ηcI
ηcW
1
kcI
[p+ σu − b]
)
< 0 where
0 = ˜JD
t
(θc, fθt (θ
c)) =
p+ σtR (fθt (θ
c)) +
λσ
r + λ
ˆ u
tR(fθt (θc))
[1− F (x)] dx− fθt (θc) k
(
1− ηtF )
ηtF
+ κ
[
1
ηcI
]
kcI
qc
(2.18)
28Formally, if parameters satisfy p+ σu − b > 0
22
with
tR
(
θt
)
= u − k
qt (θt)
×
[
r + λ
ησ
]
and
0 = ˜JD
r
(θc, fθr (θ
c)) =
p+ σrR (fθr (θ
c)) +
σλ
r + λ
[ˆ u
rR(fθr (θ
c))
[1− F (x)] dx
]
−
[
b+ θc
ηcW
ηcI
[
kcI
]
+ fθr (θ
c)
[
ηrW
ηrF
k
]]
(2.19)
with
rR (θ
r) = u − k
qr (θr)
×
[
r + λ
ησ
]
and fθt (θc) (fθr (θc)) denotes an implicit function describing the relation between θc and
(θr) θt such that the job destruction condition in the temporary (regular) labor market
is satisﬁed.
Further, if an equilibrium with both labor markets exists, then it is unique.
The full proof of proposition 2 can be found in section A.3.2 of the appendix. The
idea of the proof is that in any equilibrium in which both markets are open, there has
to be a relation between θc and θr and θc and θt such that equations 2.18 and 2.19
are satisﬁed. This deﬁnes two implicit functions: θt = fθt (θc) and θr = fθr (θc) from
equations 2.18 and 2.19. Further, equation 2.19 constrains the maximum value of θc to be
ηcI
ηcW
1
kcI
[p+ σu − b] since at this value θr is zero. One can then show that the free-entry
condition, that is equation 2.17, is downward sloping in θc. Therefore, for an equilibrium
featuring intermediaries to exist, it is a necessary condition to have FEint (0) > 0.
Intuitively, this means that in the best possible scenario for the intermediaries ( θc
arbitrarily small), they must be willing to enter. Of course, one also has to have for an
equilibrium with both labor market operating that at the maximum permissible value
of θc the free-entry condition is negative, that is FEint
(
ηcI
ηcW
1
kcI
[p+ σu − b]
)
< 0, as
otherwise only an equilibrium without a regular labor market is attainable. Uniqueness
of the equilibrium falls immediately from the fact that it can be shown that equation
2.17 is monotone.
After providing general conditions under which an equilibrium with two labor markets
exists in proposition 2, it is now derived that the necessary condition FEint (0) > 0
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can only be satisﬁed if the intermediary has some advantage vis-a-vis the regular labor
market for the worker. To make the argument clear, a case is considered where the ﬁrm's
bargaining weight is identical in both markets, that is ηtF = ηrF = ηF . For this case
one can proof the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If ηrF = ηrt = ηF and qr (θr) = qt (θt) whenever θt = θr (meaning
matching functions are identical), intermediaries are not ﬁnding it worth to enter, that
is FEint (0) < 0.
Proof. It will be shown that given ηrF = ηrt = ηF and qr (θr) = qt (θt) whenever θt = θr
we have FEint (0) < 0 under all circumstances. To see this, write equation 2.16 evaluated
at zero as
FEint (0) = ηcI
[
−b+ k1− η
F
ηF
× [fθt (0)− fθr (0)]
]
. (2.20)
One can show that ˜JD
t
(0, fθt (0)) and ˜JD
r
(0, fθr (0)) (equations 2.18 and 2.19) imply
that indeed fθt (0) > fθr (0). Notice that under the assumption of identical matching
eﬃciency, that is qr (θ) = qt (θ), it is immediately implied that rR > 
t
R from the job
creation conditions (equations 2.11 and 2.12). This information is now used to sign
equation 2.20 given what has been assumed in the proposition. To do this, subtract
˜JD
r
(0, fθr (0)) from ˜JD
t
(0, fθt (0)) ( equation 2.18 from 2.19) to arrive at
σrR (θ
r) +
σλ
r + λ
[ˆ u
rR(θ
r)
[1− F (x)] dx
]
−
[
σtR
(
θt
)
+
λσ
r + λ
ˆ u
tR(θ
t)
[1− F (x)] dx
]
+
−b+ [θt − θr] k1− ηF
ηF
= 0
Notice that the second line is exactly the term one is interested in signing. It can be
easily shown that, since rR > 
t
R, the ﬁrst line is positive. Therefore, it has to be that
the second line is negative. This completes the proof.
Importantly, it was established that in this environment the intermediary needs some
special ability to exist. The previous condition suggests immediately matching ability
as a possible candidate.29 Formally, in this environment, matching ability means that
qr (θr) < qt (θt) whenever θr = θr. Notice, within the context of the proof, dropping the
assumption that qr (θr) = qt (θt) whenever θr = θr means that from fθt (0) > fθr (0) one
can not conclude rR > 
t
R anymore.
29The other possible special ability is bargaining ability.
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In summary, in this model, if an intermediary with a particular ability in matching exists,
then the employment relationships created by this intermediary will be such that the ﬁx
costs of search associated with them will be low and the duration of these employment
relationships will be short. Further, turnover in the intermediated labor market exceeds
turnover in the regular labor market.
2.4. Numerical Analysis
This section numerically investigates the implications of the model for two possible
explanations for the secular growth of employment in the THS industry since the early
1970s (see ﬁgure 2.1). The ﬁrst explanation is related to technological progress, that is
to the ability of the THS industry to perform their services. The second explanation
is a change in the economic environment in the form of an increase in idiosyncratic
uncertainty. In the following sections, I explain my choice of functional forms and
parameters used in the numerical analysis of the model, I discuss brieﬂy the associated
steady state and I analyze the response of the model to an increase in the matching
ability of intermediaries and a rise in idiosyncratic uncertainty.
2.4.1. Calibration
Since the model above is based on a random search model of the labor market with
endogenous job destruction, I follow the original Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) paper
whenever it is possible in the choice of functional forms and parameters. Consequently,
the model operates at a quarterly frequency (r = 0.01). It is assumed that the functional
form of the matching function in the regular labor market is Cobb-Douglas mr = Ar ×
ul
r
v1−l
r
and the idiosyncratic shock is uniformly distributed on the interval [l, u]. These
standard parameter values are depicted in table 2.1.
Unfortunately, in my model, standard values for unemployment beneﬁts30 are not com-
patible with an equilibrium in which intermediaries are willing to enter the labor market.
Ultimately, this goes back to the fact that in the model workers do not get payed un-
employed beneﬁts when they are on the call-sheet of an intermediary (but not working
in a temporary job). The fact that, therefore, workers have to be compensated by the
intermediary for giving up unemployment beneﬁts makes intermediation prohibitively
30Meaning b ∈ [0.4, 0.925] - see for instance Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
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Parameter Description Value
r interest rate 0.01
p aggregate productivity 1
b unemployment beneﬁts 0*
λ job-speciﬁc shock arrival rate 0.1
σ job-speciﬁc shock disperson 0.0375
lr search elasticity of matching (regular labor market) 0.72
ηrW worker's share of the surplus (regular labor market) 0.72
Ar matching scaling parameter (regular labor market) 4
k vacancy posting costs 0.2**
u upperbound support idiosyncractic shock 1
l lowerbound support idiosyncractic shock -1
Table 2.1.: Standard parameter values. *this parameter is 0.92 in Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994). See the discussion in the text. **this parameter is not re-
ported in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) but when I tried this value in
their model it gave quantitative results that are close to the ones they report
in their paper.
expensive in the current version of the model. Therefore, to be able to conduct an anal-
ysis in which intermediated employment relationships exist, I opted for setting b = 0.
As pertaining to the remaining non-standard functional forms and parameters, I pro-
ceed as follows: I take the two other matching functions of the model to be of the
Cobb-Douglas variety as well, that is mc = Ac × ulcv1−lc and mt = At × ultv1−lt . This
seems to be a reasonable choice given there is to my knowledge no estimate or study on
these functions available.31 For the same reason, I set the elasticity parameters of the
two matching functions to the value of lr in table 2.1. With respect to the remaining
bargaining weights of the model, I assume that regular ﬁrms in the intermediated labor
market can appropriate the same share from the surplus of a match as they do in the
regular labor market (ηtF = ηrF ). Intermediaries and workers have identical bargaining
power, ηcW = 0.5. I do the former since this is in line with my proposition 3 and I do
not have better information on the parameter. I do the latter simply because I do not
have any better information on the parameter as of yet. I also set the vacancy mainte-
nance cost of intermediaries kcI to the same value as the one of regular ﬁrms and I pick
an exogenous separation rate for intermediary worker relationships of κ = 0.5. Again
there are no estimates available for these parameters, these values do not seem to be
31Neugart and Storrie (2005), as far as I know the only other paper that investigates the THS industry
in a search and matching environment, also assume a Cobb-Douglas technology in all sectors.
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Parameter Description Value
lc search elasticity of matching (call-sheet market) 0.72
Ac matching scaling parameter (call-sheet market) 0.05
lt search elasticity of matching (temporary labor market) 0.72
At matching scaling parameter (temporary labor market) 10
ηtF bargaining power of the ﬁrm (temporary labor market) 0.28
ηcW bargaining power of the worker vis-a-vis the intermediary 0.5
kcI vacancy maintenance cost intermediaries 0.2
κ separation rate workers intermediaries 0.5
Table 2.2.: Model speciﬁc parameter values.
totally unreasonable and values close to those chosen do not inﬂuence the qualitative
results I obtain below. Ac and At are then chosen such that I obtain a realistic share of
intermediated relationships in the resulting steady state equilibrium.
Table 2.3 depicts the equilibrium outcome associated with the parameters above.
The model, in this calibration, generates a number of intermediated employment re-
lationships that is close to the number observed in reality.32 Further, the model, as
predicted in the analytical analysis of the equilibrium, does generate a shorter duration
of temporary relative to regular jobs as the values for dt and dr33 in table 2.3b demon-
strate. Additionally, temporary jobs are much quicker to ﬁll then regular jobs from the
perspective of regular ﬁrms (qr vs qt). The duration rates, however, are both two large
relative to the ones found in reality and the diﬀerence between them is too small.34
Unfortunately, employment in regular jobs is too high and the unemployment rate is too
low. This is both due to the fact that I had to opt for setting unemployment beneﬁts
to zero. Consequently, labor market tightness in the regular labor market θr ≡ pr
qr
is
too high and so is the associated job ﬁnding rate pr.35 Further, the model generates a
temporary labor market in which intermediaries are able to add workers to their call
32Employment in the THS industry actually peaked in 2000. In that year, it accounted for about 2.0%
percent of U.S. employment (see ﬁgure 2.1 and for instance Luo et al. (2010) chart 1 and page 4.)
33dt (dr) is expected job duration in the temporary (regular) labor market. It is deﬁned as dt = 1
λF(tR)(
dr = 1
λF(rR)
)
which is the expected duration of receiving a shock that is below the job destruction
threshold.
34In the United States, all jobs last for about 2.5 years (see Shimer (2005)) on average whereas tempo-
rary jobs last for about 2.5 months on average (see American Staﬃng Association (2010)). The job
durations here imply regular jobs lasting on average for about 4 years and temporary jobs lasting
on average for 3 years.
35At the quarterly frequency here, pr implies that it takes workers about 3 weeks to ﬁnd a regular job
whereas in reality this number is closer to nine weeks.
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er et u uc
Model 0.9694 0.0186 0.0119 0.00013
US data 0.92 0.02 0.06
(a) Labor market stocks. Shimer (2005) reports the unem-
ployment rate to be 5.61% in an average month in the
US economy. Since I do not have data on uc available,
and since workers on the call-sheet of a THS agency
but not on assignment are counted as unemployed in
the United Stata, I say that in the data u+uc = 0.06.
The value for et comes from the fact that since the
early 2000s employment in the THS industry has been
around 2% in the US economy.
qr pr dr qt pt dt qc pc
Model 2.4555 4.8358 16.8703 6.0822 12.1332 11.9677 15.4721 0.0054
US data 2.84 1.35 10 - - 0.83 - -
(b) Vacancy ﬁlling and job duration rates. The data for qr and pr comes from Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008). The duration rates come from Shimer (2005) in the case of dr and from American Staﬃng
Association (2010) in the case of dt. As explained in the text, there is no data available on the
other variables.
Table 2.3.: Steady state equilibrium.
sheet very quickly (qc is high), and they are also able to place them fast with a client
ﬁrm (pt high). The rate at which workers obtain oﬀers from the intermediaries to join
their call sheets pc is low. As a consequence of a low pc and a high qt, the stock of
workers on the call sheet of intermediaries but not working at a client ﬁrm uc is very
small as well. These numbers stem from the fact that intermediaries, in this model, have
to compensate workers on their call sheet for giving up searching in the regular labor
market. Therefore, having workers on their call sheet is expensive for intermediaries
and this explains why uc is so low and pt is so high. Given the high value of pt, it is
also understandable that pc is so low since higher values would not be consistent with a
realistic share of employment in the THS industry et in total employment.
Consequently, one has to acknowledge that the mechanism proposed in the model is likely
to be not fully able to account quantitatively for the diﬀerence in duration between
temporary and regular jobs. This seems logical since the model at this stage ignores
possible ex-ante diﬀerences in temporary vs permanent employment positions and the
possibility of on-the-job search by workers on the call sheet of intermediaries.
In summary, the mechanism of the model is generating some of the observed diﬀerence
in the duration of temporary vs regular jobs as well as a diﬀerence in the vacancy ﬁlling
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rates of the two types of jobs. The model in its current form, however, seems to be
a too simpliﬁed description of labor market intermediation as it is not able to give a
full quantitative description of an intermediated labor market. This can be seen, for
instance, in the troubles stemming from the need to set unemployment beneﬁts to zero
in the calibration and the undershooting of the empirical diﬀerence in the duration of
intermediated and regular jobs. Despite these limitations, I am now going to use the
model in this calibration to evaluate two theories that have been proposed to explain
the growth of employment in the THS in the past 30 years.
2.4.2. The Eﬀect of Technological Progress (rise At)
The ﬁrst explanation I am going to consider relates the increase in intermediated em-
ployment relationships to technological progress. It maintains that the THS industry
has disproportionally, relative to the regular labor market, beneﬁted from innovations
in, for instance, IT and was therefore able to increase its share in overall employment.36I
will model a technological improvement that relatively beneﬁted the THS industry as
an increase in At, that is everything else equal intermediaries ﬁnd it now easier to place
workers.
Figure 2.2.: Responses of regular employment, intermediated employment, unemploy-
ment and job duration rates to an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty.
36Innovations in IT certainly have reduced the costs of applications for workers. Regular ﬁrms might
have diﬃculties to deal with the resulting swarm of applications whereas more specialized ﬁrms such
as labor market intermediaries ﬁnd it easier to cope with these types of pitfalls of technological
improvements (see Autor (2001) for an elaboration on this idea).
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An improvement of the matching technology at the hand of the intermediaries propagates
through the model as follows: regular ﬁrms now ﬁnd it less costly to recruit workers in
the intermediated labor market since they are now able to locate matches quicker. From
the job creation condition of regular ﬁrms (equation 2.12 ), this leads to an increase in the
job destruction threshold and, consequently, the duration of temporary jobs shortens (see
ﬁgure 2.2, bottom right panel). As intermediaries get more eﬃcient at matching workers
to ﬁrms, they create more call-sheets (θc rises). The eﬀect on the regular labor market of
an increase in At is triggered by the change in the value of unemployment. In particular,
as can be seen for instance in equation 2.13, the value of unemployment is going to move
up due to the increased presence of THS ﬁrms (which implies that θc increases). As a
consequence, maintaining jobs in the regular labor market becomes more expensive and
therefore the job destruction threshold also moves up and, consequently, the duration
of regular jobs decreases (see ﬁgure 2.2, bottom right panel). This means, from the job
creation condition in the regular labor market (equation 2.11), that the job ﬁlling rate
in this market qr has to rise, which implies that labor market tightness in the regular
labor market has to fall. The eﬀect on labor market stocks in this experiment is (see
also ﬁgure 2.2) such that temporary employment increases, both in absolute terms and
relative to regular employment. The prevalence of regular employment decreases whereas
unemployment moves down but not by a lot. In sum, total employment increases.
In conclusion, this model provides a mechanism that explains how technological im-
provements, that favor the THS industry relative to the regular labor market, lead to
an increase in employment in the THS industry. Additionally, the model predicts that
this increase in THS employment comes at the expense of regular jobs due to a negative
spillover eﬀect from the temporary labor market into the regular labor market. The
overall eﬀect on employment is positive but small.
2.4.3. The eﬀect of increased dispersion in productivity (rise in
σ)
The second possible explanation that I am going to consider is a change in the economic
environment which takes the form of an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty. This might
be relevant because there is evidence that idiosyncratic uncertainty has increased since
the 1970 (see Comin and Philippon (2005)) alongside the secular growth of employment
in the THS industry. Further, the paper by Ono and Sullivan (2010) provides evidence
that manufacturing ﬁrms increase the usage of temporary workers in response to in-
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creases in uncertainty. I model an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty as an increase in
σ.
Figure 2.3.: Responses of regular employment, intermediated employment, unemploy-
ment and job duration rates to an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty.
In response to an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty, there is in both markets a direct
impact on the job destruction thresholds (rR and 
t
R) and on labor market tightness (θ
r
and θt). Intuitively, in a setting with endogenous job destruction ﬁrms can shun the
disadvantages of an increase in σ (which come in the form of a greater likelihood of
low values of idiosyncratic productivity) by destroying jobs while reaping the beneﬁts
(a greater likelihood of high values of idiosyncratic productivity). Consequently, entry
into both types of jobs becomes more attractive for ﬁrms, and both θt and θr move up.
Additionally, both job destruction thresholds (rR and 
t
R) move up (see ﬁgure 2.3).
While these eﬀects are similar to the ones prevailing in a model with no intermediated
labor market, in the present model there are several additional knock-on and spillover
eﬀects: the increase in θt leads to increased entry by intermediaries (θc rises) since
they can now place their workers more easily. This increases the rate at which workers
transit into call sheet relationships with intermediaries, pc, and, on the ﬂipside, decreases
the rate at which intermediaries locate workers, qc. The increase in θc then has a
negative spillover eﬀect on the regular labor market since contracting workers is now
more expensive from the perspective of the ﬁrm. This is because the worker's outside
option rU improves with θc (see for instance equation 2.13). This means, as before, that
there is an additional negative eﬀect on employment in the regular labor market, and,
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indeeds the overall eﬀect in this setting on regular employment is negative. The eﬀect
on temporary employment is positive, and, consequently, temporary employment rises
absolutely and as a share of overall employment. The fact that temporary and regular
employment move in two diﬀerent directions is due to additional entry by intermediaries
which inﬂuences job creation in the temporary labor market positively whereas it has
a negative eﬀect on entry in the regular labor market due to its eﬀect on the value of
unemployment which increases with additional entry by intermediaries.
In this section, I investigated the implications of a simple model of intermediated em-
ployment for two possible explanations for the secular increase in employment in the
temporary help service industry since the 1970. I found that both technological progress
and a rise in idiosyncratic volatility lead to an increase in employment in the THS indus-
try. Both, increased idiosyncratic uncertainty and technological progress, require about
a doubling of the respective parameter to generate the rise in intermediated employment
observed in the data which seems plausible. When comparing the implications of the
model for the two explanations in more detail, one can see that technological progress
leads to a fall in unemployment whereas increased idiosyncratic uncertainty leads to a
fairly sharpe increase in unemployment. Further, job durations in the regular labor mar-
ket respond very strongly in the event of the uncertainty increase whereas its response
is very muted in the case of the improvement in the matching technology. These two
results seem to suggest that, according to the model here, technological progress is a
more plausible explanation for the rise in THS employment in recent decades.
2.5. Conclusion
This paper provided and investigated a random search model with endogenous job de-
struction that was augmented with a second sector in which employment relationships
are created through intermediaries. It was shown that in this setting intermediated em-
ployment relationships are of short duration and quick to form from the perspective of
employers. Therefore, the model generates two of the main characteristics of jobs in
the THS industry relative to regular jobs endogenously. It was further shown that a
superior matching ability of intermediaries is a necessary condition for an equilibrium
with intermediated jobs to exist. Lastly, I performed two comparative static exercises
numerically in order to study the models implications for two narratives that have been
put forward to explain the salient growth of employment relationships intermediated by
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the THS industry. I found that both, technological progress that eﬀects the matching
eﬃciency of THS agencies and an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty in the economy,
lead to a rise in intermediated employment relationships in the model at hand.
The analysis in this paper suggests several exciting research directions that could be
pursued in future work. For once, the model presented in this paper is extremely stylized
in the sense that all jobs and workers are ex-ante homogeneous. In reality, there is
probably a considerable amount of ex-ante heterogeneity in jobs that determines to a
large degree the observed characteristics of temporary vs regular jobs. Incorporating
ex-ante heterogeneity in jobs into the model is both challenging and promising since it
could help to overcome some of the current model's less desirable features such as the
too small diﬀerence in job duration rates between regular and intermediated jobs in the
calibration. Additionally, investigating the aggregate properties of the model seems to
be a very interesting path to pursue in future work. The reason is that the data seems to
suggest that the role of employment relationships in the THS is especially pronounced
around business cycle turning points during which employment in the THS industry
accounts for a strongly disproportional share in the change of employment (for instance
the industry was responsible for 11% of net employment losses in the Great Recession).
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3. Chapter 2: The Impact of
Uncertainty Shocks on a Dual
Labor Market, with an
Application to Spain
3.1. Introduction
In the early 1980s, many European labor markets were characterized by high unemploy-
ment and restrictive employment protection legislation.1 Governments seeking to boost
employment by making the labor market more ﬂexible quickly ran into political and
social obstacles.2 As a consequence, many governments in Western Europe resorted to
eliminating restrictions on the usage of ﬁxed-term contracts in the hope to make the la-
bor market more ﬂexible and thereby increasing employment. This led to the emergence
of dual labor markets in which a majority of workers is working on an indeﬁnite contract,
characterized by high employment protection, whereas an often large minority of work-
ers is working on ﬁxed-term contracts, which provided little employment protection.34
Due to their pervasiveness, the consequences of ﬁxed-term contracts on workers, ﬁrms
and the labor market as a whole have been subject to intense debate by politicians, the
1For an account of the European unemployment problem see Blanchard (2006).
2For an analysis of the political and social obstacles governments face when seeking to reform labor
markets, see Saint-Paul et al. (1996).
3For instance, in Spain the usage of ﬁxed-term contracts has been liberalised in 1984. Since then
the temporary employment rate in Spain has soared from about 15% in 1987 to about 35% in the
early 1990s. See the paper by Bentolila et al. (2008) for an account of the historical developments.
While the temporary employment rate in Spain is by far the highest, there are many other European
countries in which the share of temporary employment relationships in all employment relationships
is around 15% (see for instance table 1 in Booth et al. (2002)).
4In this paper, duality always means that the labor market is segmented along the lines of a perma-
nent and a ﬁxed-term employment contract.
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public at large and academics. This paper contributes to this debate by investigating
how uncertainty shocks aﬀect a dual labor market, and it does so by focussing on the
case of Spain.
The case of Spain is particularly relevant since Spain is the economy in which ﬁxed-term
contracts are most widely spread: around one third of all employment relationships are
temporary. Additionally, a recent literature initiated by Bloom (2009) has demonstrated,
in the context of the US economy, that large exogenous ﬂuctuations in uncertainty
(uncertainty shocks) have quantitatively important macroeconomic consequences and
can generate business cycle ﬂuctuations. In ﬁgure 3.1, one proxy measure of uncertainty
in the Spanish economy, quarterly volatility of the IBEX 35, the Spanish benchmark
stock market index, clearly shows that volatility in the Spanish economy displays large
bursts after, argueably exogenous, major shocks.
In this paper, I start with investigating how uncertainty shocks aﬀect the Spanish labor
market through the lense of a structural VARmodel employing the identiﬁcation strategy
devised in Bloom (2009). I ﬁnd that given this identiﬁcation strategy an uncertainty
shock leads to a drop in employment of workers on ﬁxed-term contracts, a negligible
reaction of employment of workers on permanent contracts and a recession. I also ﬁnd,
however, that the response to an uncertainty shock is very similar to the response to a
ﬁrst-moment shock to the VAR system.5 I attribute this ﬁnding to the fact that agents
might perceive the events that were used to identify uncertainty shocks as bad news
shocks or as combinations of uncertainty shocks and bad news shocks. I turn, therefore,
to the analysis of a quantitative model of the dual labor market in order to see to what
extent the response functions from the empirical analysis can be rationalized.
The model is a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model of labor adjustment.6 Key
features of the model are the existence of two types of employment contracts (ﬁxed-term
and permanent employment contracts) as well as a driving process (revenue shock pro-
cess) that is characterized by a time-varying second moment. Both types of employment
contracts are subject to adjustment costs, and I allow for the attrition rates of workers
on the two types of contracts to diﬀer. I interpret the attrition rate associated with
employment on ﬁxed-term contracts as expiring ﬁxed-term that the ﬁrm cannot extend
5The ﬁrst-moment shock is proxied by a shock to the stockmarket level.
6This type of model has been used to study a wide variety of issues related to labor demand. Relevant
examples include Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Goux et al. (2001) and Aguirregabiria and Alonso-
Borrego (2014) (dual labor markets), Bloom (2009) and Lang (2012) (uncertainty shocks), Bentolila
and Bertola (1990) (European unemployment) and Cooper and Willis (2009) (aggregate implications
of adjustment costs).
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Figure 3.1.: Volatility measure (quarterly volatilities of the IBEX 35) with volatility
events. The quarterly volatilities are obtained by computing the standard
deviation of daily returns of the IBEX 35 that fall into a particular quar-
ter. Vertical lines are large volatility events (from left to right): Black
Monday (Q4 1987), Gulf War 1 (Q3 1990), Russian, LTCM default (Q3
1998), Worldcom and Enron/Prestige Oil Spill (Q3 2002), Gulf war II (Q1
2003), Credit crunch 1: Bear Stearns bailout (2008 Q1), Credit Crunch II:
Lehman bankruptcy (2008 Q3), Credit Crunch III: Lehman aftermath (2008
Q4), European sovereign debt crises I: 1st Greek bailout program (2010 Q2).
Straight lines use a stricter selection criterium than dashed lines (see section
3.2.1 for more details) .
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further.7 To my knowledge, this model is the ﬁrst that features adjustment costs and ex-
ogenous termination of ﬁxed-term contracts in a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium
model of labor adjustment with aggregate shocks.
After calibrating the model economy to match key features of the Spanish labor market
in the previous two decades, I analyze the impact of three types of shocks on the model
economy: a (pure) second-moment shock, a (pure) ﬁrst-moment shock and a combined
ﬁrst- and second-moment shock.
The second-moment shock 8 is analyzed in two environments. The ﬁrst of these is a ver-
sion of the model in which the adjustment of temporary labor is completely free for the
ﬁrm. I ﬁnd that in this environment a second-moment shock leads to a boom in tempo-
rary labor and a recession in permanent labor. The reason is that, as higher uncertainty
in response to the shock has realized, in the aggregate, ﬁrms tend to substitute away
from permanent labor to temporary labor since higher uncertainty entails the need to
adjust labor more often and adjusting temporary labor is cheaper then adjusting perma-
nent labor. The second environment in which I am considering a pure second-moment
shock is the full version of the model where both types of labor are subject to adjustment
costs and attrition. Intuitively, one could imagine that this type of model can generate
responses to an uncertainty shock similar to those found in the empirical analysis. The
reason is that adjustment costs mean that ﬁrms reduce their hiring and ﬁring of both
types of labor (wait-and-see eﬀect) and at the same time continuing attrition leads to a
severe recession in temporary labor whereas permanent labor, due to a very low attrition
rate,9 remains almost irresponsive. I ﬁnd that this intuition is conﬁrmed on impact of
the uncertainty shock. The subsequent dynamics, however, are such that temporary
labor recovers very quickly whereas permanent labor experiences again a relatively deep
recession. The reason is the substitution eﬀect described above.
Subsequently, I turn to the analysis of a ﬁrst-moment shock 10 in the model. In this case,
both temporary and permanent employment decrease gradually towards their respective
troughs before, again gradually, returning back to their respective long-run levels. Fur-
ther, the trough in temporary employment is, relative to its long-run level, much deeper
7In the Spanish economy there is a limit on the maxium duration of ﬁxed-term contracts (3 years for
most of the period of time under consideration).
8The uncertainty shock is modelled as a jump in the second-moment of the driving process of the
model that is revealed to ﬁrms one period in advance. This approach follows the literature sparked
by Bloom (2009).
9The quarterly attrition rate on permanent labor in the Spanish economy is around 1%.
10In the model, the ﬁrst-moment shock I consider is a standard aggregate TFP shock.
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and quicker reached then the trough in permanent employment. Additionally, after the
trough in total employment is reached, temporary labor accounts for the vast majority
of net job creation in the economy. The resulting impulse response functions are similar
to those obtained in the empirical section for the case of a ﬁrst-moment shock, with the
exception that permanent employment does display a signiﬁcant negative reaction in the
model.
Lastly, a combined ﬁrst- and second moment shock is analyzed. A recent paper by Bloom
et al. (2012) has shown that a combination of these two shocks provides a better descrip-
tion of business cycles in the United States than each of these shocks does on its own.
I show that this result does not hold for the Spanish economy in the model considered
here. In particular, the combined shock means that the response of temporary employ-
ment relative to the pure ﬁrst-moment shock is biased towards zero and the reaction
of permanent employment relative to the ﬁrst-moment shock is biased towards minus
inﬁnity. Therefore, it appears that the strong diﬀerence in the variance of permanent
and temporary employment over the business cycle that is observed in the data is better
explained by a pure ﬁrst-moment shock than by a combined ﬁrst- and second-moment
shock.
3.1.1. Literature
This paper is mainly related to two strands of literature: the literature on the quanti-
tative impact of uncertainty shocks and the literature on the macroeconomic eﬀects of
duality in the labor market.
The literature on the quantitative impact of uncertainty shocks on employment and
investment decisions was initiated by Bloom (2009). His paper, in turn, builds on the
literature that investigates the eﬀects of uncertainty on investment and employment de-
cisions as well as on papers that studied the eﬀect of adjustment costs on the choice of
capital and employment. Important papers in the former literature are, for example,
Hartman (1972),Abel (1983), Bernanke (1983) and Caballero (1991). The latter liter-
ature has beneﬁted from the contributions of Fumio Hayashi (1982), Abel and Eberly
(1994), Caballero et al. (1997) and Cooper and Willis (2009) among others. This pa-
per takes from Bloom (2009) the idea that uncertainty shocks can have quantitatively
important macroeconomic consequences and the way uncertainty shocks are modelled.
Recent other papers that build on these ideas are Bloom et al. (2012) and Bachmann and
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Bayer (2013), who investigate uncertainty shocks in a general equilibrium context, Arel-
lano et al. (2011) and Gilchrist et al. (2010), who study how ﬂuctuations in uncertainty
interact with ﬁnancial markets frictions, and Schaal (2010), who analyses ﬂuctuations
in uncertainty in a search model of the labor market.11 The present paper further uses
Bloom (2009)'s approach for identifying the impact of uncertainty shocks in the data.
It contributes to the literature on uncertainty shocks by investigating their impact in an
environment in which ﬁrms are allowed to make use of two diﬀerent labor contracts in
their employment decision.
The second strand of literature that is important for this paper is the literature on the
macroeconomic impact of labor market duality. A particularly closely related paper
with respect to the modelling environment is Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992). They
focus on the impact of aggregate productivty shocks on a labor market with two types
of employment contracts in a partial equilibrium model of dynamic labor adjustment.
Other papers with a similar modelling framework are Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego
(2014), who estimate a partial equilibrium model of a dual labor market that does not
feature aggregate shocks, and Alonso-Borrego et al. (2006) ,who study the impact of
duality in the labor market in a general equilibrium model with search frictions but
without aggregate shocks. There is also a large literature that studies the impact of
duality in the search and matching framework. This literature includes the papers
by Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Bentolila et al.
(2010). All these papers belong to a much bigger literature which tries to understand the
abysmal performance of many European labor markets in recent decades (see Bertola
(2008) for an introduction to this literature). My paper contributes to this literature
by analysing how uncertainty shocks impact a dual labor market. It is further the ﬁrst
paper that investigates aggregate shocks in a dynamic ﬁrm model of labor demand with
adjustment costs on both types of employment.
Lastly, there is a vast literature that investigates the impact of duality on labor market
outcomes of individuals. This literature will be of some relevance in the calibration of
the model. For an overview see Booth et al. (2002) and references therein.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 3.2, I conduct the
empirical analysis. Section 3.3 lays out the economic model. The quantitative analysis
can be found in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes. The appendix contains robustness
11Another interesting recent paper is Lang (2012) who studies what types of uncertainty shock generate
the dynamics in Bloom (2009) and also provides an explanation for the disparate ﬁndings regarding
the impact of uncertainty shocks in Bloom et al. (2012) and Bachmann and Bayer (2013).
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checks for the empirical analysis and some additional information related to the model.
3.2. Empirical Analysis
In this section, I investigate the response of the Spanish labor market to an uncertainty
shock through the lense of a structural VAR model using the identiﬁcation strategy of
Bloom (2009).
3.2.1. Uncertainty Measure and Data
The measure of quarterly uncertainty in the Spanish economy is derived from daily data
of the main Spanish stock market index IBEX 35. This data is used to compute daily
returns and subsequently the standard deviation of all returns that fall into a particular
quarter.12 This gives a series of quarterly volatilities of the IBEX 35 that goes from Q2
1987 to Q4 2013, which is the time period for which the IBEX 35 data exists. The series
is plotted in ﬁgure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 shows that quarterly uncertainty in the Spanish economy displays large sudden
spikes13. During these episodes, quarterly uncertainty in the Spanish economy often more
than doubles relative to its level in normal times. Additionally, ﬁgure 3.1 demonstrates
that these spikes can be associated with political and economic events that are arguably
exogenous to the Spanish economy such as, for instance, Black Monday in Q4 1987 or
Gulf war II in Q1 2003.14
All other data used in the analysis is available at a quarterly frequency and ranges from
Q2 1987 to Q4 2013. Consequently, the time series consist of 107 observations in total.15
The time series of real GDP comes from the OECD. The time series on employment
on temporary and permanent contracts was obtained from the Instituto Nacional de
12I compute quarterly volatilities since all other data is available at a quarterly frequency.
13Straight lines are at quarters where the volatility index is 1.65 standard deviations above its mean.
Dashed lines are additionally at quarters where the volatility index was 1.28 standard deviations
above its mean.
14One event that is possibly not exogenous to the Spanish economy is the ﬁrst Greek bailout program in
Q2 2010. I address this issue in the analysis below by conducting a robustness experiment in which
I exclude the time period of the European sovereign debt crises from the analysis. Additionally, the
events relating to the ﬁnancial crises in 2008 might be viewed as a single volatility event. Again, I
address this issue through robustness experiments in the analysis below.
15Unfortunately, time series data on the employment of workers on ﬁxed-term contracts for the Spanish
economy is not available for dates prior to Q2 1987.
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Estadística which is the national statistic oﬃce of Spain. Since I am interested in an
analysis at the business cycle frequency, I follow standard procedures in applying a
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (smoothing parameter equal to 1600) to the natural logarithm of
all variables.
In Figure 3.2 and ﬁgure 3.3, I plot the raw data and the associated cyclical component
for each times series employed in the analysis (ﬁgure 3.2 displays data related to the
stock market and ﬁgure 3.3 data related to the real economy). Table 3.1 displays the
standard deviation of each detrended series as well as the correlation of each detrended
series with the detrended volatility measure and with detrended GDP. The ﬁgures and
the table reveal the well known facts that employment on ﬁxed-term contracts is more
volatile than employment on permanent contracts and that the former is also tied closer
than the latter to movements in GDP. Additionally, ﬁgure 3.3 reveals the spectacular
growth of employment on ﬁxed-term contracts that characterized the Spanish economy
over much of the period considered in the analysis.
Figure 3.2 and table 3.1 further reveal that the volatility measure derived from the IBEX
35 is quite volatile relative to GDP and the two employment series. Further, the series
of the level of the IBEX 35 and the volatility indicator derived from the IBEX 35 display
a negative correlation indicating that times of high volatility are not necessarily times
in which the stockmarket is in a state of crisis.
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Figure 3.2.: Raw data (left-hand side) and cyclical component (right-hand side) of the
IBEX35 and the volatility measure.
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Variable Standard deviation Corr(x,volatiliy index) Corr(x,GDP)
Volatility index 0.350 1 0.12
Stockmarket level 0.1499 -0.24 0.25
GDP 0.0153 0.12 1
Permanent employment 0.0162 0.24 0.5
Temporary employment 0.056 -0.18 0.65
Table 3.1.: Standard deviations and contemporaneous correlations of logged and de-
trended variables.
Figure 3.3.: Raw data (left-hand side) and cyclical component (right-hand side) of GDP,
permanent and temporary employment.
3.2.2. Structural VAR analysis
In this section, ﬁrst, the strategy used to identify the impact of uncertainty shocks on the
Spanish economy is discussed. Second, I present the results for a baseline speciﬁcation.
Third, I discuss the robustness experiments I carried out (details of which are to be found
in appendix B.1.1) and, fourth, I study the impact of a ﬁrst-moment shock, proxied by
a shock to the stock market level, on the Spanish economy.
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As mentioned above, I borrow the strategy to identify the impact of uncertainty shocks
on the Spanish economy from Bloom (2009) who empirically investigated the impact of
uncertainty shocks on the US economy through the lense of a (structural) VAR model.
His insight is that uncertainty shocks are caused by events that are exogenous to the
economy under consideration. Therefore, it is justiﬁed to assume that shocks to the
uncertainty measure employed aﬀect the other variables in the VAR system contempo-
raneously but not vice versa which puts a restriction on the order of the variables in
the VAR system. He then performs a wide variety of robustness checks to make sure
that the results obtained from his baseline model do not depend on the order of the
other variables in the VAR system, the deﬁnition of the exogenous events and or other
spurious factors.16
I use a baseline model which includes the logged and detrended series of the volatility
measure, employment on ﬁxed-term contracts, employment on permanent contracts and
GDP (in this order) with two lags. Figure 3.4 shows the estimated responses to an
uncertainty shock (a shock to the volatility measure). The top left panel of ﬁgure 3.4
displays the response of the volatility measure. One can see that the volatility measure's
response has a relatively short half-life time as inspection of the series shown in ﬁgure
3.1 suggested. The top right panel of ﬁgure 3.4 displays the response of employment on
ﬁxed-term contracts. It can be seen that employment on ﬁxed-term contracts displays
a signiﬁcant negative reaction before returning to its long-run value. The response of
employment on permanent contracts, displayed in the bottom left panel of ﬁgure 3.4,
in contrast, does not display a signiﬁcant reaction in response to the uncertainty shock.
GDP, shown in the bottom right panel of ﬁgure 3.4, displays a (signiﬁcant) recession in
response to the uncertainty shock.
16See section 2.2 in Bloom (2009) for the analysis of his baseline model and appendix A.3. for his
robustness analysis.
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Figure 3.4.: Impulse-response functions to a volatility shock when the volatility measure
is the actual volatility series: (clockwise from top left) uncertainty measure,
temporary employment, GDP and permanent employment.
In appendix B.1.1, I demonstrate that the above ﬁndings are robust with respect to a
set of changes in the speciﬁcation of the VAR system. In a ﬁrst set of experiments (see
section B.1.1 in the appendix), I use, instead of the actual volatility measure as in ﬁgure
3.4, a binary series which takes on a value of 1 at each of the volatility shocks marked
by the vertical lines in ﬁgure 3.1 and 0 otherwise. In case I use only very large volatil-
ity events (straight vertical lines in ﬁgure 3.1), the estimated impulse responses remain
quantitatively very similar but they are not signiﬁcant anymore. This is not surprising
since in the time period covered by the data only six such very large volatility events
occured. If we use all volatility events marked in ﬁgure 3.1 (straight and dashed verti-
cal lines), the impulse responses of employment on ﬁxed-term contracts and GDP are
signiﬁcant again. The results of this experiment are important since they give us conﬁ-
dence that the responses are indeed driven by the large, arguably exogenous, volatility
shocks rather than by the many, possibly endogenous, smaller ﬂuctuations of the volatil-
ity measure. In another experiment (see section B.1.1 in the appendix), I include the
stock market level into the VAR system in order to make sure that the impact of stock
market levels is already controlled for when looking at the impact of uncertainty shocks.
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In an additional set of experiments (see section B.1.1 in the appendix), I conﬁrm that
the results displayed in ﬁgure 3.1 are robust towards excluding the period of the Euro
crises from the analysis.17
Finally, I investigate the response of the VAR sytem in question to a (negative) ﬁrst-
moment shock to the stock market level. The corresponding impulse response functions
are plotted in ﬁgure 3.5. It is apparent that these impulse response functions are quan-
titatively very similar to the responses to an uncertainty shock displayed in ﬁgure 3.4.
This, unfortunately, makes it diﬃcult at this stage to rule out the possibility that the
impulse responses shown in ﬁgure 3.4 are not purely reﬂecting the response of the Span-
ish economy to an uncertainty shock. It seems, for instance, to be possible that the
events that are behind the impulse response functions of ﬁgure 3.5 are perceived as bad
news shocks (or a combination of bad news and an increase in uncertainty) by the agents
constituting the Spanish economy and this is what drives the impulse responses in ﬁgure
3.5 and in ﬁgure 3.4.18
17I also conduct experiments to make sure that my results are robust towards the order of the two
employment series and GDP in the VAR. These results are not reported in this document.
18For a summary article of the literature on how news can drive business cycle ﬂuctuations see Paul
Beaudry and Portier (2013).
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Figure 3.5.: Impulse-response functions to a (negative) ﬁrst-moment shock (a negative
shock to the stock market level): (clockwise from top left) uncertainty
measure, temporary employment, GDP and permanent employment. The
dashed red lines are the 90% conﬁdence bands. The ﬁgure looks diﬀerent
from the other impulse-response functions in this text since it had to be
manually created.
I conclude from the empirical analysis that given the employed identiﬁcation strategy
uncertainty shocks to the Spanish economy lead to fall in employment on ﬁxed-term
contracts, a negligible response in employment on permanent contracts and a recession.
These results prevail in various robustness exercises. The analysis, however, also shows
that the responses to an uncertainty shock are very similar to the responses to a ﬁrst-
moment shock (proxied by a shock to the stock market level). This might be because
agents perceive the events in ﬁgure 3.1 not (only) as uncertainty shocks but (also) as bad
news shocks. Consequently, the empirical analysis in this section is not fully conclusive
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with respect to the impact of uncertainty shocks on the Spanish economy. Therefore, in
the following section I proceed by devising a quantitative model of the dual labor market
in order to investigate to what extent this model can rationalize the impulse response
functions to an uncertainty shock documented in ﬁgure 3.4.
3.3. The Model Economy
In this section, I devise a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium labor demand model
of the dual labor maket in order to investigate to what extent the empirical ﬁndings
from section 3.2 can be rationalized by this model. This type of model has been used
by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) to
analyze issues related to dual labor markets. Further, it has been used to understand the
meager performance of European labor markets by, for instance, Bentolila and Bertola
(1990) and in the context of uncertainty shocks by Bloom (2009) and Lang (2012).
The model economy is comprised of a large number of ex-ante identical ﬁrms which
discount the future at rate r. These ﬁrms seek to maximize the inﬁnite sum of expected
discounted proﬁts by selecting sequences of employment of permanent contract workers
(PCW henceforth) and temporary contract workers (TCW henceforth) in the face of
stochasticity in the demand for their product and or their productivity. They take wages
for both types of labor as given, and changing employment might entail adjustment costs.
More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms face a constant elasticity demand function of the form
Y d = B˜P− (3.1)
where  is the elasticity of demand and B˜ is a potentially stochastic demand shifter.
They have further access to a constant or decreasing returns to scale production function
given by
Y = A˜KαKLαL .
Here, K is capital which is supposed to be freely and instantaneously adjustable through-
out the analysis, A˜ is productivity and αK and αL are the output elasticities of capital
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and labor respectively. L is labor in eﬃciency units employed in production, and it is
assumed to be given by
L = lP + ξlT .
In this formulation, it is assumed that labor in eﬃciency units employed in production
is a linear combination of PWC and TWC employed, and their relative productivities
are regulated by the parameter ξ. This formulation views PCW and TCW as perfect
substitutes who diﬀer in their contribution to labor in eﬃciency units employed in pro-
duction. Productivity diﬀerences are meant to capture the fact that in reality TCW
often enjoy fewer training than PCW and thus they contribute less per head to labor
in eﬃciency units used in production. Perfect substitutability allows me to focus on
adjustment costs and stochasticity in demand and or production conditions as motives
for employing TCW. It is also a common assumption in the literature.19
The demand and the production function can be combined into a revenue function20 of
the form
R
(
lP , lT , A
)
= A
γ
1−α
(
lP + ξlT
) β
1−α × κ. (3.2)
In equation 3.2, A is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc revenue shock. The parameters α, β and γ are
reduced-form parameters comprised of the parameters of the underlying demand and
production functions, and κ is a parameter that depends on the interest rate and on
parameters of the underlying production function and the demand schedule.
It is assumed that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc revenue shock at t At,i is composed of a ﬁrm-level AFt,i
and an aggregate component AAt which combine multiplicatively to the revenue shock
At,i = A
F
t,i × AAt . (3.3)
Both components of the revenue shock are assumed to follow AR (1) processes in logs.
19I share this assumption with the papers by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Goux et al. (2001),
Alonso-Borrego et al. (2006), Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) and many more papers.
See Dolado et al. (2002a) section 2.1. for an analysis in which TCW and PCW are not perfect
substitutes.
20See Appendix B.2 for a detailed derivation.
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The ﬁrm-level component of the revenue shock evolves in accordance with
lnAFt,i = ρ
F lnAFt−1,i + σ
F
t−1
F
t,i
with Ft,i ∼ N (0, 1) (3.4)
and the aggregate component in accordance with
lnAAt = ρ
A lnAAt−1 + σ
AAt
with At ∼ N (0, 1) . (3.5)
Crucially, the standard deviation of the innovations in equation 3.4 is time-varying. I
follow Bloom (2009) and the large literature he sparked in assuming that σFt can take
on two values,
σFt ∈
{
σFL , σ
F
H
}
, (3.6)
and that the transition between them is regulated by a transition matrix
Πσ
F
=
[
piσ
F
LL pi
σF
LH
piσ
F
HL pi
σF
HH
]
. (3.7)
This formulation is both sparse and allows to study the impact of large exogenous
uncertainty shocks in the model economy. It also embodies the timing assumption of
Bloom (2009) and the literature thereafter in that the variance of the innovation of the
ﬁrm-level component of the revenue shock is known to the decision maker in the model
one period in advance. Further, with this formulation, I also make the assumption
that the ﬂuctuations in the uncertainty measure from ﬁgure 3.1 above translate into
ﬂuctuations in the variance of the distribution of the ﬁrm's revenue shock. This is a leap
common in the literature on uncertainty shocks initiated by Bloom (2009). Further, as
it is evident from equation 3.5, I assume that the variance of the aggregate component
of the revenue shock does not feature any time-varying variance in the innovations. This
simpliﬁes the calibration and the solution of the model while still allowing me to study
the impact of aggregate uncertainty shocks.
The model also allows for adjustment costs on both types of labor. Adjustment costs
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are given by the following function
AC
(
eP , eT
)
= max
(
eP , 0
)× θHP −min (eP , 0)× θFP
+ max
(
eT , 0
)× θHT −min (eT , 0)× θFT (3.8)
where ePt (e
T
t ) is the change of PCW (TCW) used in production by the ﬁrm between
two adjunct periods. I follow Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) in allowing for
hiring and ﬁring costs for TCW. Intuitively, hiring a TCW from the unemployed requires
expenses from the ﬁrm that might, for instance, stem from locating and screening the
worker. The estimates from Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) conﬁrm that
hiring costs are not much diﬀerent between PCW and TCW. As pertaining to ﬁring
costs, it is important to note that statutory requirements actually are such that if a
TCW is released before termination of his contract, then severance payments are similar
to the ones for PCW.21Further, I focus on one type of adjustment cost since this allows
me to convey the intuition behind my results below in a clear manner.22 I chose piecewise
linear adjustment costs since this type of adjustment costs captures mandatory severance
payments which play such a large role in the Spanish labor market.23and because previous
literature has found this type of adjustment costs to be the most important adjustment
cost in the Spanish labor market for both types of contracts.24
It is further assumed that PCW' employment evolves in accordance with
lPt = (1− δp) lPt−1 + ePt .
The parameter δP regulates how much of PCW' employment is destroyed from one period
to another for reasons outside the control of the ﬁrm such as, for instance, exogenous
quits and retirement. The evolution of TCW' employment is given by
lTt =
(
1− δT ) lTt−1 + eTt .
21See Dolado et al. (2002b), footnote 5, and Cahuc et al. (2012), appendix A. The paper by Cahuc et al.
(2012) focuses on a theoretical analysis that centers around this feature of temporary contracts in a
search and matching environment.
22Further, incorporating quadratic and ﬁxed adjustment costs would not qualitatively aﬀect my results.
23For instance, during the 1980 the termination of a permanent contract required the ﬁrm to pay 20
days of wages per year of service to the worker (up to 12 monthly wages). This could go up to 45
days of wages per year of service (up to 24 monthly wages) if the dismissal was deemed unfair by a
court which was frequently the case. The regulations governing permanent contracts were reformed
a few times in the period thereafter, but dismissal costs remained high (see table A in Güell and
Petrongolo (2007) for details on these reforms).
24See table 4 on page 950 in Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014).
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In this equation, δT reﬂects TCW' employment that is destroyed for reasons outside of
the ﬁrm's control. Importantly, this parameter is meant to capture ﬁxed-term contracts
that terminate and that the ﬁrm can not extend for statutory reasons.25 Including
this feature is important since in Spain almost all destruction of temporary jobs occurs
upon contract termination.26 This modelling approach does not capture two aspects
from reality. First, in reality, the ﬁrm can choose the duration of ﬁxed-term contracts
whereas here the duration of ﬁxed-term contracts lies outside the control of the ﬁrm. The
issue with letting the ﬁrm choose the duration of ﬁxed-term contracts in this modelling
environment is that it would mean that the optimization problem of the ﬁrm would
feature as many state variables as contract durations which would make the model
computationally intractable. The modelling approach suggested here captures the fact
that at every point in time some temporary contracts will expire which the ﬁrm can not
extend in a sparse manner.27 Second, in reality, ﬁrms have the option to promote their
TCW to a PCW. I did not include this feature into the model because of computational
diﬃculties that arose when trying to solve such an extended model. I do not, however,
expect that incorporating this feature would change my results qualitatively too much
since conversion rates in recessions, the focus of the numerical analysis below, should be
low.
Finally, the recursive formulation of the dynamic problem of the ﬁrm is given by
V
(
lPt−1, l
T
t−1, At, σt
)
= max
ept ,e
t
t
{
R
(
lPt + ξl
T
t , At
)− AC (ePt , eTt )− wPt lPt − wTt lTt
+
1
1 + r
× EAt,σt
[
V
(
lPt , l
T
t , At+1, σt+1
)]}
(3.9)
subject to lPt =
(
1− δP ) lPt−1 + ePt , lTt = (1− δT ) lTt−1 + eTt and lPt , lTt ≥ 0.
25In Spain, the maximum duration for ﬁxed-term contracts has been three years since 1984.
26See Dolado et al. (2002b), footnote 5.
27This modelling approach is similiar to an approach used in recent quantitative papers on sovereign
default that study the eﬀects of maturity and maturity structure in sovereign default models. In
the papers by Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and Arellano
and Ramanarayanan (2012) the sovereign, instead of holding a portfolio of bonds with diﬀerent
maturities, holds only one bond of which a certain exogenous fraction, which is to be understood as
the average maturity of the bond portfolio, matures every year. Further, it is similar to the search
and matching literature on dual labor markets of the type considered here which often assumes
an exogenous high arrival rate of job destruction shocks for temporary jobs (see Bentolila et al.
(2010)).
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3.4. Quantitative Analysis
3.4.1. Calibration
I calibrate the model to reproduce key characteristics of the Spanish economy since the
early 1990s.28 A summary of all parameter values can be found in table 3.2.
A time period in the model is going to correspond to one quarter in the real world.
Therefore, I set the discount factor of ﬁrms to 1
1+r
= 0.95
1
4 .
Regarding the revenue function, I set α = 0.25 and β = 0.5. These choices imply a
coeﬃcient on labor in eﬃciency units employed in production in the revenue function of
β
1−α =
2
3
. The latter value is close to values used and estimated in the literature on the
Spanish economy. For instance, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) estimate the
coeﬃcient on labor in eﬃciency units employed in production in their revenue function
to be 0.69 and Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997) use 2
3
as well. Further, the values of α
and β are consistent with standard production function parameters of αK = 23 , αL =
1
3
and a mark-up of 33%. I also set γ = (1− α) which is a common assumption in models
of this type.29
Regarding wages and relative productivities of TCW and PCW, I set the parameter
that regulates relative productivity of the two types of labor to ξ = 0.85 which is the
value Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) estimate for this parameter. I set wr,
the wage of PCW, to 1 which together with wt = 0.865 implies a share of TCW in total
employment of about 1/3. Additionally, the fact that TCW earn about 14% less than
PCW is consistent with actual wage diﬀerences between PCW and TCW (see Dolado
et al. (2002a)).
As explained in section 3.3, I consider solely piecewise linear adjustment costs. Following
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014)'s estimates, for PCW I set hiring costs to 0.1
and ﬁring costs to 0.5 of their yearly wage. For workers on ﬁxed-term contracts, I use
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014)'s hiring cost estimate of 0.1 (of their yearly
wage). I set ﬁring costs to 0.5 (of their yearly wage) as well since this is consistent with
statutory requirements described in section 3.3, and, further, this value ensures that
almost all job destruction of temporary contracts occurs through contract termination.
28The growth of employment on temporary contracts caused by an employment reform in 1984 (see
Dolado et al. (2002b), section I.) ended in 1992. At this point employment on temporary contracts
made up slightly above 30% of total employment (see also ﬁgure 3.3). It had remained around that
level ever since.
29See, for instance, Cooper and Willis (2009) and Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014).
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Alonso-Borrego et al. (2006) report an annualized value of 0.0232 for the attrition rate
of PCW. I am, however, setting this value to zero since (very) small attrition rates can
not be handled by my computational algorithm. 30 Since this value is small in the data,
I do not expect this choice to inﬂuence my results to a great deal. I opt to set δt = 0.125
which is going to imply that each quarter about 12.5% of temporary workers leave their
employment relationship.
Lastly, I turn to the parameters describing the revenue shock process. Regarding the
transition matrix Πσ, I make use of the information contained in the uncertainty measure
from ﬁgure 3.1. I set the probability of transitioning from the regime with low uncertainty
to the regime with high uncertainty to piσL,H = 0.056. This means that agents in the
model expect a period of heightened uncertainty to occur 6 times in 107 quarters which
is the frequency with which the very large volatility events (straight lines) occur in the
volatility measure. I, then, set piσH,H = 0.79 which implies an average half-life of the
high uncertainty regime of 3 quarters which is roughly the value found in my data.
Regarding the standard deviation of the innovations and the persistence of the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc component, I use the estimates from Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014).
They ﬁnd a value of 0.207 for the standard deviation of innovations and and a value of
0.931 for the persistence parameter using yearly data and a constant standard deviation
of innovations. These two values imply a standard deviation of innovations of 0.102
and a persistence of 0.931
1
4 at the quarterly frequency. Since in this study the standard
deviation of innovations is time-varying, I set σFL = 0.075 and σ
F
H = 2.5×σFL implying an
average standard deviation of innovations of about 0.102. Having the standard deviation
of innovations increasing by a factor of 2.5 in response to an uncertainty shock, seems
reasonable when inspecting the series depicted in ﬁgure 3.1. Regarding the aggregate
shock process, I use a process with ρA = 0.95 and σA = 0.008.
For a given calibration, I obtain the solution to the model numerically using discrete
value function iteration.31 To obtain the stochastic steady state of the model, I simulate
a panel of 5000 ﬁrms over 300 periods 1500 times. The ﬁrst 100 periods of each simulation
are discarded and I subsequently compute the statistics of interest for each simulation
and then average across simulations. The resulting values are depicted in table 3.3.
30The issue is that in my computational algorithm, which relies on discrete value function iteration,
in order to make sure that all possible choices of labor lie on the grid the diﬀerence between two
adjunct grid points y and x (where y > x) is always y × δ (where δ is an attrition rate). As δ
becomes very small (but remains diﬀerent from zero), this leads to grids with a lot of gridpoints.
See section B.3.1 for details on the computational algorithm.
31Additional information regarding my solution strategy is given in section B.3.1 in the appendix.
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Parameter Value
1
1+r
0.95
1
4
α 0.25
β 0.5
γ 1-α
wT 0.85
wP 1
ξ 0.85
θH
p
0.1*4*wP
θF
p
0.5*4*wP
θH
T
0.1*4*wT
θF
T
0.5*4*wT
δP 0
δT 0.125
piσL,H 0.056
piσH,L 0.79
ρF 0.931
1
4
σFL 0.075
σFH 2× σFL
ρA 0.95
σA 0.008
Table 3.2.: Parameters.
Statistic Model Data
standard deviation PCW' employment (×100) 1.38 1.62
standard deviation TCW' employment (×100) 6.02 5.6
% of TCW in total new hires 86.55 91 to 97
% of TCW ﬁred every quarter 12.53 16
% of PCW ﬁred every quarter 0.74 2
% of TCW in total employment 27.62 ~30
Table 3.3.: Steady state characteristics. Standard deviation data is from my own cal-
culations (see table 3.1). Other data is from Güell and Petrongolo (2007).
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Table 3.3 illustrates that the model reproduces many of the salient characteristics of
the Spanish labor market in the last two decades. In particular, the model generates
volatilities of PCW' employment and TCW' employment that are close to the ones in the
data (see table 3.1). Further, as in reality the vast majority of new hires in the economy
is on temporary contracts.32 Turnover among TCW is high and much higher than for
PCW. Quantitatively, the values for the percentage share of TCW in new hires and the
two turnover numbers are somewhat below the corresponding numbers in the data. The
percentage share of TCW in new hires was above 90% for the period between 1985 and
2002 (see Güell and Petrongolo (2007), ﬁgure 1) and it was 87.2% in the period 1998-2007
(as reported by Bentolila et al. (2010)). Regarding the two turnover numbers, Güell and
Petrongolo (2007) (in table 1) report that the likelihood for a TCW to transition from
employment to nonemployment is 0.1626 and the corresponding number for a PCW is
0.02.
3.4.2. Uncertainty Shock with Fully Flexible Fixed-term
Contracts
I start the numerical analysis with an economy in which the adjustment of TCW is
completely free θH
T
= θF
T
= 0.33 This is of interest because a model of this type
has been used often in the literature34 and, additionally, helps to make the eﬀect of an
uncertainty shock in the model transparent.
Policy Functions.
To further understanding of the eﬀect of an uncertainty shock in this model, I start with
an analysis of the policy functions of ﬁrms. Figure 3.6 plots policy functions for the
model with fully ﬂexible ﬁxed-term contracts. The left column shows policy functions
for PCW, TCW and total employment as a function of inherited PCW (lp − t on the
x-axis) for a low revenue shock, and the right column does so for a high revenue shock.
Each policy function is depicted once for an economy in which temporary contracts are
32Since in the steady state the percentage share of TCW in total hires equals the percentage share of
TCW in total ﬁrings, TCW also account for the vast majority of ﬁrings as in reality.
33In this case the value of δt does not matter for the optimal policy of the ﬁrm since workers that leave
the ﬁrm for exogenous reasons can be replaced costlessly. I do also adjust wt in order to obtain a
share of TCW in total employment that is consistent with the data. In the present case, this implies
wt = 0.92 and the share of TCW in total employment is then 30.67%.
34See for example Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992).
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available (red lines) and for an economy without temporary contracts (blue lines).35
Lastly, each policy function is shown for a low variance (dashed lines) and for a high
variance regime (straight lines).
Figure 3.6.: Policy functions. x-axis is inherited PCW (lPt ). Rows refer to policy func-
tions for PCW (top, lPt+1), TCW (middle, ξ× lTt+1) and total labor employed
(bottom, lPt+1 + ξl
T
t+1) in eﬃciency units. The left column refers to a low
revenue shock. The right column refers to a high revenue shock. Red lines
refer to an economy in which TCW are available (ξ > 0) and blue lines to
one in which they are absent (ξ = 0). Dashed lines refer to policies in the
low variance regime (σFL ) and straight lines to policies in the high variance
regime (σFH).
The demand for permanent contract workers is shown in the top row of ﬁgure 3.6.
It displays the characteristic inaction region for intermediate values of inherited PCW
across all volatility regimes and economies. With the speciﬁcation of adjustment costs
considered here, the inaction region arises because for intermediate inherited values of
PCW the marginal costs of adjusting upwards are too high to justify hiring and the
marginal gains from adjusting downwards are too low to justify ﬁring.36 Turning to the
35In the economy with temporary contracts ξ > 0 and in the economy without temporary contracts
ξ = 0.
36For an extended analytical analysis of the eﬀect of piecewise linear adjustment costs in the context
of an investment model, see, for instance, Abel et al. (1996).
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eﬀect of diﬀerent levels of uncertainty on the policy function for PCW, one sees that the
inaction region is larger under higher uncertainty for both economies. This is because of
the wait-and-see eﬀect which arises because higher uncertainty makes future adjustment
more likely to be necessary and in order to avoid the associated costs ﬁrms tend to be
more passive today. This eﬀect of uncertainty has been explored theoretically by for
instance Abel (1983) and Bernanke (1983) and its quantitative importance has been
investigated in the literature sparked by Bloom (2009).
The demand for temporary contract workers is shown in the second row of ﬁgure 3.6.
One can see that the demand for temporary labor is positive below the inaction region
and then declines monotonically towards zero. The demand for TCW is positive below
the inaction region because in this region, due to the presence of adjustment costs, the
diﬀerence between marginal revenue and wages is positive at the chosen level of PCW.
To the extent that marginal revenue at the choice of PCW is above the going wage
for TCW the ﬁrm is going to want to hire TCW. Since below the inaction region the
ﬁrm chooses to produce with a constant level of PCW (for a given revenue shock), the
amount of TCW the ﬁrm hires is constant as well. As the inaction region for PCW
is reached, PCW' employment rises with inherited PCW (at a rate of (1− δp)), and,
therefore, the marginal revenue at the choice of PCW falls with inherited PCW and this
lowers the demand for TCW linearly since TCW and PCW combine linearly to total
labor (see equation 3.2). At the point where the demand for TCW becomes zero, the
ﬁrm would in principal like to reduce total employment further, however, due to the
presence of adjustment costs it does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to reduce PCW and, of course,
TCW employment can not be reduced below zero. Additionally, one can also see in
ﬁgure 3.6 that the demand for TCW rises with the revenue shock. This is because the
higher the revenue shock, the more careful ﬁrms are in their decision to hire PCW since,
due to mean-reversion in the revenue shock process, they expect their (idiosyncratic)
production environment to worsen. Further, one can see that the demand for TCW
rises with uncertainty. This is because the demand for PCW falls with uncertainty and
therefore the marginal revenue from PCW increases with uncertainty and this creates
space for hiring TCW.
An interesting and important aspect to analyze is how the presence of temporary labor
aﬀects the demand for permanent labor. In ﬁgure 3.6, one can see that the presence
of TCW actually causes ﬁrms to hire PCW more cautiously and to ﬁre them more
vigorously (compare red and blue lines in the top row of ﬁgure 3.6 ). The reason is that
the presence of TCW provides ﬁrms with a device to adjust labor upwards relatively
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cheaply but not downwards. This asymmetry is going to play a prominent role when
analyzing the eﬀect of an uncertainty shock on the economy with TCW.
Simulating an Uncertainty Shock
In this section, I investigate the eﬀect of an uncertainty shock in the model with fully
ﬂexible ﬁxed-term contracts. In particular, I simulate a panel of 5000 ﬁrms over 300
periods 2500 times. In period 200 the uncertainty shock occurs. I model the shock by
setting σF200 = σ
F
H across all 2500 simulations. Prior and after period 200 the dynamics
of the uncertainty shock are governed by the volatility process' transition matrix (see
equation 3.7). I obtain the responses by computing the statistics of interest (e.g. aggre-
gate employment, TCW' employment and PCW' employment) for each simulation and
then I average across simulations.
Figure 3.7 presents response functions for key time series of the model economy to
an uncertainty shock (black lines). Additionally, ﬁgure 3.7 contains for comparative
purposes the response functions for a model economy in which the adjustment of PCW
is costlessly possible (blue lines)37 and for an economy with adjustment costs on PCW
but without ﬁxed-term contracts 38 (red lines).
37This is modelled by setting θH
P
= θF
P
= 0. Notice that in this economy ﬁrms never ﬁnd it optimal
to employ TCW.
38This is modelled by setting ξ = 0.
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Figure 3.7.: Depicted series are: average value of σFt (top right), total employment
(top right), PCW' employment (bottom right), TCW' employment (bottom
right). All series are expressed as percentage deviations from the stochastic
steady state. The uncertainty shock occurs at the vertical line.
The evolution of average uncertainty in the economy is displayed in the top left panel of
ﬁgure 3.7. One can see that upon impact the average level of uncertainty in the economy
almost doubles and then returns to its pre-shock level quickly. This is consistent with
the short half-life the uncertainty spikes in ﬁgure 3.1 have.
One further sees that in the economy with no adjustment costs on PCW (blue line)
the uncertainty shock has no employment eﬀect on impact and subsequently leads to a
boom in total employment. This is because, in the calibration here, the optimal policy
for PCW' employment in the absence of any adjustment costs is convex in the revenue
shock and consequently as the variance of the revenue shock actually rises (which given
the timing of the model happens one period after the uncertainty shock hit) employment
booms. This eﬀect is called the Oi-Hartman-Abel eﬀect 39 in Bloom et al. (2012).
In the economy with adjustment costs on PCW but without TCW (red line), we see that
an uncertainty shock leads to a small decrease in PCW' employment on impact and a
boom in subsequent periods. The decrease on impact stems from a combination of two
39See Oi (1961), Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983).
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eﬀects. First, in a world with adjustment costs, an increase in uncertainty tomorrow
causes ﬁrms to freeze hiring and ﬁring today due to the high likelihood of having to
revert today's hiring and ﬁring decision tomorrow which is costly. This is the wait-and-
see eﬀect of an increase in uncertainty. Second, attrition of PCW continues unabatedly,
and overall these two eﬀects lead to a drop in employment. In the present calibration,
the decrease in employment stemming from these two eﬀects is small, and this is because
attrition in the Spanish labor market is low. The subsequent dynamics are then driven
by the Oi-Hartman-Abel eﬀect described above.
Finally, in the economy with adjustment costs on PCW and TCW (black lines),d the
uncertainty shock causes a boom in TCW' employment in the periods after the date
at which the shock hits. Additionally, the shock causes a recession in permanent em-
ployment and a boom in overall employment. The behavior of TCW' employment is
explained by the fact that, as the variance of the revenue shock rises, more ﬁrms ﬁnd
themselves in the (far) right tail of the revenue shock distribution, and these ﬁrms exploit
their beneﬁcial revenue shock (mainly) by hiring TCW. This is because mean reversion
in the revenue shock process implies that ﬁrms do not expect their currently high rev-
enue shock to last for a long time, and, therefore, they respond to it by hiring TCW to
avoid labor adjustment costs today and in the future. Turning to the response of PCW'
employment, notice that increased uncertainty means that hiring and ﬁring is elevated.
As argued above, in the present calibration, increased hiring dominates increased ﬁring
in the absence of TCW and this is due to the Oi-Hartman-Abel eﬀect. In the presence
of TCW, however, ﬁrms avoid costly hiring of PCW to a degree by employing TCW
whereas this device is not available to the same degree for ﬁring decisions. This is the
asymmetry that was also manifest in the policy functions discussed in section 3.4.2.
Consequently, in this simple model, an uncertainty shock causes a boom in TCW' em-
ployment and a recession in PCW' employment. Further, the model's response to an
uncertainty shock is strongly at odds with the response found in the empirical analysis
in section 3.2.
3.4.3. Uncertainty Shock with Fixed-term Contracts with
Adjustment Costs
This section analyzes the eﬀect of an uncertainty shock in the version of the model
economy that features adjustment costs and attrition on TCW. Intuitively, one could
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imagine that this version of the model economy is able to generate responses to an
uncertainty shock that resemble the ones found in the empirical analysis (see ﬁgure
3.4). The idea is that on impact of the uncertainty shock hiring and ﬁring of TCW
freezes due to the wait-and-see eﬀect described in the previous section. At the same
time, temporary contracts keep expiring (attrition of TCW continues unabatedly). The
consequence is a steep recession in the employment of TCW. PCW' employment responds
very little to the shock for two reasons: the wait-and-see eﬀect causes a freeze in hiring
and ﬁring, and, additionally, the low attrition rate of PCW means that there is little
attrition and consequently no recession in the employment of PCW. To see whether this
intuition is conﬁrmed in the actual dynamics generated by the model, I conduct the
same simulation experiment as described in the previous section for the version of the
model with adjustment costs and attrition on TCW.
Simulating an Uncertainty Shock
Figure 3.8 collects the responses of aggregate employment, PCW' employment and
TCW' employment. One can see that on impact of the shock (at the vertical lines)
TCW' employment displays a deep recession whereas PCW' employment is almost irre-
sponsive. The mechanics behind these dynamics are exactly the ones described above:
hiring and ﬁring freezes on both types of contracts but the greatly diﬀering attrition
rates lead to a big fall in TCW' employment whereas PCW' employment remains close
to its long-term level. The subsequent dynamics are such that TCW employment re-
covers quickly and then overshoots its long-run level whereas PCW' employment enters
into a relatively deep and prolonged recession. The explanation for these dynamics is
again that as higher uncertainty actually prevails in the economy, on the one hand, ﬁrms
in the right tail of the revenue shock distribution hire TCW vigorously to exploit their
favorable but likely short-lived production environment. Firms in the left tail of the
revenue shock distribution, on the other hand, ﬁre PCW and this explains why in the
aggregate we observe a substitution away from PCW to TCW in the periods following
the impact of the uncertainty shock.
In conclusion, the model is able to capture some of the features of the empirical response
functions to an uncertainty shock from section 3.2.2. In particular, employment of TCW
displays a large negative response upon impact of the uncertainty shock whereas PCW'
employment displays almost no reaction on impact. Subsequently, however, the impulse
response functions from the model and the empirical analysis diverge. This is due to the
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Figure 3.8.: Depicted series are: average value of σFt (top right), total employment (top
left), PCW employment (bottom right), TCW employment (bottom right).
All series are expressed as percentage deviations from the stochastic steady
state. The uncertainty shock occurs at the vertical line.
fact that as uncertainty is actually elevated in the model economy, ﬁrms with a good
revenue shock start hiring TCW vigorously whereas ﬁrms with a bad shock ﬁre PCW.
This leads to a large boom in TCW' employment and to a large recession in PCW'
employment.
3.4.4. First-Moment Shock and Combined First- and
Second-Moment Shock
In this section, I investigate the impact of a ﬁrst-moment shock and a combined ﬁrst-
and second-moment shock in the model. The ﬁrst-moment shock in both cases is a
negative shock to the aggregate component of the revenue process.
Figure 3.9 shows the response function to a ﬁrst-moment shock.40 It is evident that this
shock leads to a big recession in total employment which contracts by about 6% relative
to its stochastic steady state value. Additionally, the brunt of the labor adjustment in
40The simulation experiment is as above except that now at period 400 I set the aggregate component
of the revenue shock to a low value across all simulations.
63
the recession is borne by TCW. Indeed, from peak to trough TCW' employment con-
tracts by about 16% whereas PCW' employment reaches its trough about 2.5% below its
stochastic steady state value. One also sees that both, PCW' and TCW' employment,
decline gradually, due to the adjustment costs, towards their respective trough. This
trough is reached earlier for TCW employment. These dynamics are consistent with
real world time series of the Spanish economy. They also underscore that it is impor-
tant to include adjustment costs on TCW in the model.41 Lastly, these dynamics are
largely consistent with the ones found when investigating the impact of a ﬁrst-moment
shock in the empirical analysis (see ﬁgure 3.5). The exception is the response of PCW'
employment which is signiﬁcant in the model whereas it is not in the data.
Figure 3.9.: First-moment shock. Depicted series are: average value of the the aggregate
component of the revenue shock, total employment (top left), PCW em-
ployment (bottom right), TCW employment (bottom right). All series are
expressed as percentage deviations from the stochastic steady state. The
ﬁrst-moment shock occurs at the vertical line.
Figure 3.10 shows the response function to a combined ﬁrst- and second-moment shock
(black lines).42 For the purpose of comparison, the response functions to a pure ﬁrst-
41A ﬁrst moment shock of this type in the model without adjustment costs on TCW would mean that
TCW' employment in response to the ﬁrst-moment shock reaches its trough after one period. This
dynamic is clearly not observed in reality.
42The simulation experiment is as above except that now at period 400 I set the aggregate component of
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moment and a pure second-moment shock are included as well. As pertaining to the
response of TCW' employment, one can see that the initial response is most negative in
the case of the combined ﬁrst- and second-moment shock. Subsequently, the dynamics of
the response are for a while governed by the second-moment shock: the fact that idiosyn-
cratic productivity is now actually further spread out causes ﬁrms that ﬁnd themselves
in a favorable production environment to hire TCW. After some quarters, however, the
eﬀect of the negative ﬁrst-moment shock starts to take over and TCW' employment falls
again below its long-run value to which it subsequently returns slowly. The fact that at
ﬁrst the eﬀect of the second-moment shock dominates the dynamics and later the eﬀect
of the ﬁrst-moment shock is explained by the diﬀering degrees of persistent in the two
shocks: while the ﬁrst-moment shock is relatively persistent, the second moment has a
very brief half-life (see the top left panel of ﬁgure 3.10). As pertaining to the response
of PCW' employment, one can see that the ﬁrst- and second-moment shock actually
reinforce each other. Consequently the trough in PCW is by far the gravest in case of
the two shocks occurring together. Relative to the ﬁrst-moment shock, the combined
ﬁrst- and second moment shock causes the response functions of PCW' and TCW' em-
ployment to diverge in the wrong direction: the response of PCW' employment to the
shock becomes more negative whereas it becomes less negative for TCW' employment.
Therefore, in this model, a combined ﬁrst- and second-moment shock does not seem to
help to describe the Spanish business cycle dynamics better than a ﬁrst moment shock
alone. This result contrasts with the ﬁnding in Bloom et al. (2012) that a combined
ﬁrst- and second-moment shock provides a better description of business cycles in the
US economy then each of these shocks does on its own.
the revenue shock to a low value and the variance of the innovations of the idiosyncratic component
of the revenue shock to a high value across all simulations.
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Figure 3.10.: Combined ﬁrst- and second-moment shock. Depicted series are: average
value of the the aggregate component of the revenue shock, total employ-
ment (top left), PCW employment (bottom right), TCW employment (bot-
tom right). All series are expressed as percentage deviations from the
stochastic steady state. The combined ﬁrst- and second-moment shock at
the vertical line.
3.5. Conclusion
In this paper, I investigated the impact of uncertainty shocks on a dual labor market
focussing on the case of Spain. I showed in an empirically analysis that, given the
employed identiﬁcation strategy, uncertainty shocks in the Spanish economy seem to
cause a signiﬁcant drop in temporary employment, a negligible reaction of permanent
employment and a recession. However, in the empirical analysis, I was not able to
exclude the possibility that these dynamics stem from ﬁrst-moment shocks or from a
combination of ﬁrst- and second-moment shocks.
Therefore, I devised a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model of the dual labor
market that allowed for aggregate ﬁrst- and second-moment shocks. I calibrated the
model to reproduce key characteristics of the Spanish economy in recent decades. I
analyzed the impact of a (pure) second-moment, a (pure) ﬁrst-moment and a combined
ﬁrst- and second-moment shock in the model. For the (pure) second-moment shock,
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I found that the reaction of permanent and temporary employment to an uncertainty
shock is consistent with the empirical responses on impact of the uncertainty shock. The
subsequent dynamics, however, are very diﬀerent in the sense that temporary employ-
ment quickly starts to boom whereas permanent employment enters a relatively deep
recession. For the (pure) ﬁrst-moment shock, I found that the associated dynamics are
qualitatively consistent with the ones from the empirical analysis in the sense that the
shock in the model leads to large decline in temporary and permanent employment.
Further, the decline in temporary employment is larger relative to its stochastic steady
state value, and the trough in temporary employment is reached quicker. For the com-
bined ﬁrst- and second moment shock, I found that it is unlikely that such a shock helps
to improve explaining the business cycle dynamics of the Spanish economy relative to
a pure ﬁrst-moment shock. The reason is that the second-moment shock ampliﬁes the
drop in permanent employment from the ﬁrst-moment shock whereas it dampens the
response of temporary employment to the ﬁrst-moment shock. Therefore, this type of
shock is less likely relative to a (pure) ﬁrst-moment to generate the fact that in Spain
temporary employment is much more volatile than permanent employment along the
business cycle.
In this paper, I investigated the response of the Spanish labor market to uncertainty
shocks in a partial equilibrium model. The recent study by Bloom et al. (2012) has
shown that general equilibrium eﬀects tend to dampen the Oi-Hartman-Abel eﬀect.
Therefore, they are crucial for their model to provide a good description of US business
cycle dynamics. In the present environment, however, general equilibrium eﬀects are
unlikely to reconcile the model's response to an uncertainty shock with the response
found in the data. The reason is that the disparities stem chieﬂy from the presence
of a substitution eﬀect from PCW to TCW in response to the uncertainty shock and
not from the Oi-Hartman-Abel eﬀect. It seems, therefore, that the main results of this
paper are likely to be robust towards general equilibrium eﬀects. Nevertheless, studying
aggregate shocks in a general equilibrium model of the dual labor market remains a
largely unexplored and important avenue for future research.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1. Graphical Illustration of the Model
Figure A.1.: Graphical illustration of the ﬂows of the model. The regular labor market
is on the right and the temporary labor market on the left.
Red ellipses are matching functions: Mr - matches unemployed workers
with ﬁrms. Mc - matches unemployed workers and intermediares with
empty call sheets, M t - matches intermediary worker pairs with (client)
ﬁrms.
Rectangles are labor market stocks: u - unemployed workers, er - regular
employment relationships, vr - vacancies in the regular labor market, vc -
empty call sheets, uc - ﬁlled call sheets (search worker intermediary pairs),
et - temporary (intermediated) jobs, vt - ﬁrms searching for temporary
workers.
Straight (black) lines are matches. Dashed (black) are inputs into matching
functions. Red (dashed) lines are ﬂows of destroyed matches.
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A.2. Labor Market Stocks
Equations 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 imply the following equilibrium values of u, er, et and uc
given thresholds etR and e
r
R and labor market tightnesses θ
t, θr and θc
u =
κ× λF (rd)× λF
(
td
)
pc × [λF (rd)λF (td)]+ prκλF (td)+ ptpc × λF (rd)+ κλF (rd)λF (td) (A.1)
er =
pr × κλF (td)
pc × [λF (rd)λF (td)]+ prκλF (td)+ ptpc × λF (rd)+ κλF (rd)λF (td) (A.2)
et =
ptpc × λF (rd)
pc × [λF (rd)λF (td)]+ pr × κλF (td)+ ptpc × λF (rd)+ κλF (rd)λF (td)(A.3)
uc =
pc × λF (rd)× λF
(
td
)
pc × [λF (rd)λF (td)]+ pr × κλF (td)+ ptpc × λF (rd)+ κλF (rd)λF (td)(A.4)
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A.3. Omitted Derivations
A.3.1. Derivation of Equilibrium Equations
Derivation of Job Destruction Condition
The surplus in the temporary labor market is given by
St () = F tJ () +W tJ () + I tJ ()− I tV − U tV
Multiplying through with r, inserting the corresponding asset pricing equations and
making use of the threshold property (Lemma 1) gives
(r + λ)St () = p+ σ+ λ
ˆ u
tR
St (x) dF (x)
−
z + pt [W tJ (u)−W tV ]+ κ [W u −W tV ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
W tV

−
−z + pt [I tJ (u)− I tV ]− κ [IcV − IItV ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ItV

Making use of the implications of Nash bargaining and the free entry assumptions this
can be written as
(r + λ)St () = p+ σ+ λ
ˆ u
tR
St (x) dF (x)
−
[
ηtW
ηtF
k × θt − κ
[
ηcW
ηcI
]
1
qc
kcI
]
−
[
ηtI
ηtF
k × θt − κ 1
qc
kcI
]
76
which is
(r + λ)St () = p+ σ+ λ
ˆ u
tR
St (x) dF (x)
−
(
1− ηtF )
ηtF
k × θt + κ
[
ηcW
ηcI
+ 1
]
kcI × 1
qc
(A.5)
Inserting equation A.6 solved for κ 1
ηcI
kCe
qe
and evaluating at  = td delivers the job
destruction condition for the temporary labor market (equation 2.14) :
0 = p+ σtR +
λσ
r + λ
[ˆ u
tR
[1− F (x)] dx
]
−
[
b+ θckcI
ηcW
ηcI
+
ηrW
ηrF
k × θr
]
− rkcI 1
ηcI
× 1
qc
.
The derivation of the job destruction condition for the regular labor market is analogous.
Derivation of the Equilibrium Version of the Intermediarie's Free-Entry
Condition
Remember the deﬁnition of the surplus when a worker and an intermediary form a
call-sheet relationship
Sc = W tV + I tV −W u
Multiplying through by r and inserting the corresponding asset pricing equations delivers
rSc = pt
[
I tJ (u)− I tV
]
+ pt
[
W tJ (U)−W tV
]
+ κ
[
W u − I tV −W tV ]− rW u
Notice that from Nash bargaining I tJ (u) − I tV = ηtISt (u) and
[
W tJ (U)−W tV
]
=
ηtWSt (u). Further, the ﬁrm's free-entry condition into the temporary labor market
implies that F tV = 0 in equilibrium and therefore equation 2.2 implies k
qt
= F tJ (u).
Since F tJ (u) = ηtFSt (u) from Nash bargainning we can write
(r + κ)Sc =
[
ηtW + ηtI
ηtF
]
k × θt − rW u
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which since ηtW + ηtI =
(
1− ηtF ) is the same as
(r + κ)Sc =
[
1− ηtF
ηtF
]
k × θt − rW u
Further, rW u is given by
rW u = b+ pc
(
W tV −W u)+ pr (W rJ (u)−W u) .
Nash bargaining when workers are added to an intermediaries call sheet implies W tV −
W u = ηcWSc and from the intermediaries free-entry condition it can be concluded that
kcI
qc
= IcV = ηcISc in equilibrium. Further, in the regular labor market Nash bargaining
implies that
[
W rJ (u)−W u
]
= ηrWSr (u) and kqr = F
rJ (u) = η
rFS (u). Therefore,
rW u = b+
ηcW
ηcI
kcI × θc + η
rW
ηrF
k × θr
The surplus Sc can consequently be expressed as
(r + κ)Sc =
[(
1− ηtF )
ηtF
]
k × θt −
b+ θCkCeηcWηcI + θr ηrWηrF k︸ ︷︷ ︸
rWu

The free-entry condition for intermediaries implies
kcI
qc
= ηcISc
and therefore
(r + κ)
k
qC
= ηcI
[
−kCf +
[(
1− ηtF )
ηtF
]
θtk −
[
b+ θCkCe
ηcW
ηcI
+ θr
ηrW
ηrF
k
]]
(A.6)
which is equation 2.16.
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A.3.2. Proof of Proposition 2 (Existence and Uniqueness)
The proof of proposition 2 goes as follows: Take the job destruction condition of the
regular labor market (equation 2.13) and solve it for θc.
θc =
ηcI
ηcW
1
kcI
×
[
p+ σrR (θ
r) +
σλ
r + λ
[ˆ u
rR(θ
r)
[1− F (x)] dx
]
− b− η
rW
ηrF
kr × θr
]
(A.7)
Notice that rR (θ
r) = u − kqr(θr)
[
r+λ
σηtF
]
are those combinations of θr and rR that are
consistent with the job creation condition for ﬁrms in the regular labor market (equation
2.11). This function determines the range of possible values for θc that are consistent
with both θr ≥ 0 and θc ≥ 0 as
θc ∈
[
0,
ηcI
ηcW
1
kcI
[p+ σu − b]
]
(A.8)
Denote the implicit function mapping θc into θr such that equation A.7 is satisﬁed by
fθr (θ
c). On the interval described in equation A.8 one can use the implicit function
theorem to get
∂fθr (θ
c)
∂θc
=
∂θr
∂θc
= − −
ηcW
ηcI
kcI
∂rR(θ
r)
∂θr
×
[
σ[r+λF(rR(θr))]
r+λ
]
− ηrW
ηrF
k
< 0
Intuitively, since a larger θc means a higher value of unemployed, ﬁrms ﬁnd it less
attractive to create jobs in the regular labor market and consequently θr is going to fall
in equilibrium.
Now turn to the job destruction condition in the temporary labor market written as (see
equation A.5 evaluated at the job destruction threshold).
0 = p+ σtd
(
θt
)
+ λ
ˆ u
td(θ
t)
[1− F (x)] dx
− kη
tW + ηtI
ηtF
× θt + κ
[
1
ηcI
]
kcI
qc
(A.9)
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Again tR (θ
t) = u − kqt
[
r+λ
ηtF σ
]
are those combinations of θt and tR that are consistent
with the job creation condition for ﬁrms in the temporary market (equation 2.12). This
equation deﬁnes an implicit relation between θt and θc. The mapping of θt into θc such
that equation A.9 is satisﬁed is denoted by fθt (θc). Notice that as long as 0 ≤ θt < ∞
this equation can always be satisﬁed and therefore the relevant range for θc is indeed
given by equation A.8 as stated in proposition 2.
Further, the implicit function theorem delivers
∂fθt (θ
c)
∂θc
=
∂θt
∂θc
= −
∂JDt
∂θc
∂JDt
∂θt
= −
−κ
[
kcI
ηcI
1
[qc]2
[qc]′
]
∂td
∂θt
[
σ[r+λF(td(θt))]
r+λ
]
− k ηtW+ηtI
ηtF
> 0
Intuitively, an increase in θc means more intermediaries in the market which in turn
makes the market more attractive for regular ﬁrms such that θt rises.
Consider now the free-entry condition of intermediaries (equation 2.16). The implicit
relations fθr (θc) and fθt (θc) are used to write it as a function of θc only.
FE(θc) = ηcI
[[
ηtW + ηtI
ηtF
]
k × fθt (θc)−
[
b+ kcI
ηcW
ηcI
× θC + η
rW
ηrF
k × fθr (θc)
]]
−(r + κ) 1
ηcI
kcI
qc
(A.10)
The goal is now to sign this function. The derivative of A.10 w.r.t. θc is given by
dFE
dθc
=
[
ηtW + ηtI
ηtF
]
k × ∂θ
t
∂θc
− η
cW
ηcI
kcI − η
rW
ηrF
k × ∂θ
r
∂θc
+ (r + κ)
[
1
ηcI
] [
k
[qc]2
]
[qc]′
Forming a commong denominator one can write
dFE
dθc
=
[
ηtW + ηtI
ηtF
]
k
 κ
[
kCe
ηcI
1
[qc]2
[qc]′
]
∂td
∂θt
[
σ[r+λF(tR(θt))]
r+λ
]
− k ηtW+ηtI
ηtF
− kcI ηcWηcI
−η
rW
ηrF
k
 η
cW
ηcI
kcI
∂r(θr)
∂θr
×
[
σ[r+λF(rR(θr))]
r+λ
]
− ηrW
ηrF
k
+ (r + κ) 1ηcI
[
kcI
qC
] [
qC
]′
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Cancelling terms brings us
[
ηtW+ηtI
ηtF
]
kκ
[
kCe
ηcI
1
[qc]2
[qc]′
]
+ (r + κ) 1
ηcI
[
kCe
[qC ]2
] [
qC
]′ × [∂td
∂θt
[
σ[r+λF(td(θt))]
r+λ
]
− k ηtW+ηtI
ηtF
]
∂td
∂θt
[
σ[r+λF(tR(θt))]
r+λ
]
− k ηtW+ηtI
ηtF
+
−kcI ηcW
ηcI
[
∂rR(θ
r)
∂θr
×
[
σ[r+λF(rd(θr))]
r+λ
]
− ηrW
ηrF
k
]
− ηcW
ηcI
kCe η
rW
ηrF
k[
∂r(θr)
∂θr
×
[
σ[r+λF(rd(θr))]
r+λ
]
− ηrW
ηrF
k
]
This is the same as
(r + κ) 1
ηcI
[
kCe
[qC ]2
] [
qC
]′ ∂td
∂θt
[
σ[r+λF(td(θt))]
r+λ
]
− r 1
ηcI
[
kCe
[qC ]2
] [
qC
]′
k η
tW+ηtI
ηtF
∂td
∂θt
[
σ[r+λF(td(θt))]
r+λ
]
− k ηtW+ηtI
ηtF
+
−kCe ηcW
ηcI
∂r(θr)
∂θr
×
[
σ[r+λF(rd(θr))]
r+λ
]
[
∂r(θr)
∂θr
×
[
σ[r+λF(rd(θr))]
r+λ
]
− ηrW
ηrF
k
] < 0
which is negative since
∂td(θt)
∂θt
< 0, qc < 0.
Therefore, in any equilibrium in which both labor markets are open the free-entry con-
dition of intermediaries is downward sloping in θc.
Therefore, for an equilibrium with intermediaries to exist we have to have that as θc → 0
the value of entry has to be positive. This is equivalent to saying that parameters have
to be such that
ηcI
[[
ηtW + ηtI
ηtF
]
fθt (0) k −
[
b+ fθr (0)
ηrW
ηrF
k
]]
> 0
is satisﬁed.
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B. Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1. Appendix to Empirical Part
B.1.1. Robustness Exercises
In this section, I conduct robustness exercises for the VAR results from section 3.2.2.
I show that the results prevail when using a binary variable that indicates the large
volatility events from ﬁgure 3.1 as the volatility measure in the VAR (section B.1.1).
I further demonstrate that the results are robust towards controlling for movements in
the stock market level (section B.1.1) and towards changes in the time period for which
the analysis is conducted (section B.1.1).
Binary series of large volatility events
Figure B.1 shows that the estimated impulse resposes from the VAR model are quanti-
tatively very similar when volatility is measured by a 1/0 indicator of very large and
crucially argueably exogenous volatility events (straight lines in ﬁgure 3.1). Unfortu-
nately, the results loose their signiﬁcance in this event. This is expected since the 1/0
indicator of very large volatility events contains only six events. For this reason, I
use a relaxed criterium to select volatility events from the series in ﬁgure 3.1 (straight
and dashed lines in the ﬁgure) which gives me 10 events in total. Here, as ﬁgure B.2
demonstrates, the impulse responses have the same signiﬁcance properties as the impulse
responses from the main text.
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Figure B.1.: Impulse response functions to a volatility shock when the uncertainty mea-
sure is an indicator of very large volatility events (events marked by
straight vertical lines in ﬁgure 3.1): (clockwise from top left) uncertainty
measure, employment on ﬁxed-term contracts, GDP and employment on
permanent contracts.
Figure B.2.: Impulse response functions to a volatility shock when the uncertainty mea-
sure is an indicator of large volatility events (events marked by straight
and dashed vertical lines in ﬁgure 3.1): (clockwise from top left) uncertainty
measure, employment on ﬁxed-term contracts, GDP and employment on
permanent contracts.
Controlling for the stock market level
To control for the possibility that my VAR results are in fact driven by changes in the
stock market level, I investigate whether the results are robust towards including said
variable into the VAR estimation. The results are shown in ﬁgure B.3 and are clearly
very similar to the ones of the baseline model in section 3.2.2. I also repeat this exercise
by replacing the actual volatility series from ﬁgure 3.1 by the two volatility indicators
from section B.1.1. The results from the main text remain robust.
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Figure B.3.: Impulse response functions to a volatility shock when the uncertainty mea-
sure is the actual volatility series from ﬁgure 3.1 (logged and detrended)
and we control for shocks to the stock market level: (clockwise from top
left) uncertainty measure, employment on ﬁxed-term contracts, GDP and
employment on permanent contracts.
Controlling for the Euro crises
Lastly, I restimate the VAR model on a time period that excludes the Euro crises since
ﬂuctuations in my uncertainty measure during that period are argueably not exogenous
to the Spanish economy. Figure B.4 shows that the resulting impulse responses are again
very similar to the ones from the baseline model in section 3.2.2. Again I also repeat
this exercise by replacing the actual volatility series from ﬁgure 3.1 by the two volatility
indicators from section B.1.1. The results from the main text remain robust.
Figure B.4.: Impulse response functions to a volatility shock when the uncertainty mea-
sure is the actual volatility series from ﬁgure 3.1 (logged and detrended)
and the period of the Euro crises is exluded in the analysis: (clockwise from
top left) uncertainty measure, employment on ﬁxed-term contracts, GDP
and employment on permanent contracts.
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B.2. Derivation of the Revenue Function
Demand is given by
Y d = B˜P−
Output is given by
Y = A˜KαKLαL
Revenue is given by
R˜
(
A˜, B˜,K, L
)
= B˜
1
 (Y )−
1
 × Y
= B˜
1

(
A˜KαKLαL
)− 1

(
A˜KαKLαL
)
= B˜
1
 A˜
−1
 KαK[
−1
 ]LαL[
−1
 ]
Then deﬁne α ≡ αK −1 and β ≡ αL
[
−1

]
and then deﬁne Aγ ≡ B˜ 1 A˜ −1 .
Then we have
R (A,K,L) = AγKαLβ
Then we solve for r given A and L
(
AγLβ
)
αKα−1 = r
Then we get
K =
[ r
AγLβα
] 1
α−1
=
[
r−
1
1−αα
1
1−α
]
× A γ1−αL β1−α
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Then we insert this into the above to get
Π (A,L) = AγLβ ×
[[
r−
1
1−αα
1
1−α
]
× A γ1−αL β1−α
]α
− r
[[
r−
1
1−αα
1
1−α
]
× A γ1−αL β1−α
]
= A
γ
1−αL
β
1−α
[[
r−
α
1−αα
α
1−α
]]
− r− α1−αα 11−α × A γ1−αL β1−α
= A
γ
1−αL
β
1−α
[
r−
α
1−α
[
α
α
1−α − α 11−α
]]
= A
γ
1−αL
β
1−α
[
r−
α
1−α
[
α
α
1−αα
1−α
1−αα−
1−α
1−α − α 11−α
]]
= A
γ
1−αL
β
1−α
[
r−
α
1−α
[
α
1
1−αα−1 − α 11−α
]]
= A
γ
1−αL
β
1−α
[
r−
α
1−αα
1
1−α
[
α−1 − 1]]
We write this as
Π (A,L) = A
γ
1−αL
β
1−α × κ
and κ =
[
r−
α
1−αα
1
1−α [α−1 − 1]
]
.
B.3. Appendix Related to the Quantitative Part
B.3.1. Computational Algorithm
To solve the model, I use discrete value function iteration. I discretize all four continuous
state variables
(
lP , lT , AA, AF
)
. To discretize AA and AF , I use Tauchen (1986)'s proce-
dure. I use an adapted code for AF that is able to take into account the two uncertainty
regimes.1 I construct the grid for lP and lT such that the diﬀerence between two adjunct
grid points xi and xi+1 (xi+1>xi) is exactly δxi+1 whenever δ > 0.2 With this method,
I make sure that I do not have to interpolate in the value function iteration. Interpola-
tion in the value function iteration is problematic in the case considered here since with
adjustment costs the value function is potentially non-smooth. This method has two
potential problems: ﬁrst, the grid is unevenly spaced with large gaps between the large
values in the grid. I address this problem by interlinking multiple grids constructed in
the manner described above. The second disadvantage is that at the lowest grid point
1Eventually, I ended up using code from the paper Bloom et al. (2012) which I downloaded from
Nicholas Bloom's website. I wish, however, to explicitly thank my former colleagues Jan-Hannes
Lang for providing me with his code at an earlier stage of this project.
2δ is the attrition rate that is δ = δT or δ = δP depending on whether we look at the grid for PCW
or for TCW.
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ﬁrms necessarily have to pay adjustment costs. However, this problem is not very severe
since the grid is very ﬁne as the grid points approach zero (I also include zero in the
grid) when using this method of constructing the grid. In case δ = 0, I use an evenly
spaced grid. Then, I solve the model using simple discrete value function iteration.
As pertaining to the number of grid points I set NlP = 50, NlT = 110, NAA = 5,
NAF = 20.
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